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This Article identifies and explores a new, local law enforcement approach to alleged 
drug offenders. Initially limited to a few police departments, but now expanding 
rapidly across the country, this innovation takes one of two primary forms. The first 
is a diversion program through which officers refer alleged offenders to community-
based social services rather than initiate criminal proceedings. The second form 
offers legal amnesty as well as priority access to drug detoxification programs to 
users who voluntarily relinquish illicit drugs. Because the upsurge in addiction to 
—and death from—opioids has spurred this innovation, I refer to it as “opioid 
policing.”  
This new approach improves in key ways upon previous state responses to illicit 
drug use. Opioid policing has explicit public-health aims—seeking improved life 
outcomes for people addicted to drugs without relying on arrest. By contrast, the 
War on Drugs incentivized arrests, which create myriad negative consequences for 
drug-law offenders—with few discernible offsetting social gains. Opioid policing 
also avoids the most problematic aspects of specialized drug courts. Scholars and 
reformers have documented how these courts provide substandard treatment and 
employ procedures that frequently lead to more, rather than less, entanglement with 
the criminal system. Unlike the drug court, opioid policing operates at the pre-
booking phase, rather than after legal proceedings have already begun, allowing 
drug users to avoid the harms of criminal processing entirely. 
Notwithstanding its salutary features, opioid policing retains key troubling 
characteristics of both War on Drugs policing and drug courts. The structure of 
opioid policing programs creates incentives for law enforcement to expand, rather 
than reduce, surveillance of marginalized populations. What is more, opioid policing 
may re-entrench rather than disrupt the distributive inequities of race and class that 
permeate previous state responses to illicit drug use. Ultimately, the assessment this 
Article undertakes reveals both the limitations of drug-reform efforts situated within 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prescriptions for, addiction to, and death from opioids have risen dramatically in 
the past two decades.1 In this period, personal use of opioid painkillers went up nearly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See generally Opioids: Brief Description, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids [https://perma.cc/3XNJ-ZEMS] (defining 
opioids as a class of drugs that includes pain relievers available legally by prescription, such 
as oxycodone, marketed as OxyContin; hydrocodone, marketed as Vicodin; codeine; 
morphine; the illegal drug heroin; and synthetic products such as fentanyl and carfentanil). 
While medical commentators once differentiated between natural and synthetic forms of the 
drug, with “opiate” referring to the former and “opioid” to the latter, that distinction has for 
the most part been abandoned. Stephanie Labonville, IWP: The Patient Advocate Pharmacy, 
Opiate, Opioid, Narcotic - What’s the Difference? (Mar. 29, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://info 
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500%.2 Though regulators have begun to crack down on over-prescription by 
doctors,3 illicit opioid use persists; heroin and fentanyl use are both on the rise.4 Over 
two million people currently meet the medical criteria for opioid use disorder.5 In 
2017, 47,000 people died from opioid-related overdose deaths,6 a number higher than 
in the previous year.7 The number of drug overdose-related deaths exceeds American 
casualties at the peak of the AIDS crisis.8 
                                                                                                                 
 
.iwpharmacy.com/opiate-opioid-narcotic-whats-the-difference [https://perma.cc/2SQY 
-XLAA]; see infra notes 132–60 and accompanying text. 
 2.  G. Caleb Alexander, Thomas W. Clark, David T. Courtwright, John L. Eadie, 
Catherine S. Hwang, Andrew Kolodny &  Peter Kreiner, The Prescription Opioid and Heroin 
Crisis: A Public Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 
559, 560 (2015).  
 3. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 
OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES 11, 66 (2017) (noting that prescription rates peaked 
in 2010 and have since fallen). 
 4. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEROIN OVERDOSE DATA (2017) 
(“[H]eroin use has been increasing in recent years among men and women, most age groups, 
and all income levels.”). The CDC rejects the causal link that some observers have made 
between increased regulation of opioid prescription and increase in use of street drugs.  See, 
e.g., Gery P. Guy Jr., Kun Zhang, Michele K. Bohm, Jan Losby, Brian Lewis, Randall Young, 
Louise B. Murphy & Deborah Dowell, Vital Signs: Changes in Opioid Prescribing in the 
United States, 2006–2015, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.  REP. (2017), https://www 
.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6626a4.htm [https://perma.cc/TSL9-B2MY]. 
 5. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND 
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2016 NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 30 (2017) (noting that 2.1 million people met the criteria 
for opioid use disorder in 2016). 
 6. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, OVERDOSE DEATH RATES, https://www.drugabuse 
.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/4MTU-CUUK] 
(noting rise in deaths from opioids and indicating that 2017 data are provisional);  CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DRUG OVERDOSE DEATH DATA, https://www.cdc 
.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/A43S-RLWX] (noting opioids 
involved in over 42,000 fatal overdoses); Sheila Kaplan, C.D.C. Reports a Record Jump in 
Drug Overdose Deaths Last Year,  N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/11/03/health/deaths-drug-overdose-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/82YP-JQEV] (noting increase 
of seventeen percent in drug overdose deaths between 2015 and 2016). 
 7. Andrew Sullivan, The Poison We Pick, N.Y. MAGAZINE: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 
20, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/02/americas-opioid-epidemic.html 
[https://perma.cc/YF3D-C35V] (citing data suggesting the total number of 2017 opioid-related 
overdose deaths will rise to 52,000). 
 8. Compare Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid 
-epidemic-drug-overdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html [https://perma.cc/AB6Z 
-35AB] (finding 64,000 deaths from drug overdoses in 2016), with David R. Holtgrave, 
Causes of the Decline in AIDS Deaths, United States, 1995–2002: Prevention, Treatment or 
Both?, 16 INT’L J. STD & AIDS 777, 778, tbl.1 (2005) (noting 51,670 AIDS deaths in the 
United States in the peak year of 1995), and Sullivan, supra note 7 (noting Vietnam War 
deaths). See also Kaplan, supra note 6 (noting that opioid overdose is now the leading cause 
of accidental death for Americans under the age of fifty). 
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 Federal and state policymakers have begun to push for severe criminal 
penalties for people who sell or share opioids, 9  including urging prosecutions under 
so-called “drug-induced homicide” statutes.10 Such statutes permit homicide 
prosecutions whenever a defendant delivers a controlled substance and someone dies 
from ingesting it;11 the only mens rea requirement is that the defendant knew she was 
delivering a controlled substance, as opposed to a standard of recklessness or 
negligence.12 
Notwithstanding this move to crack down on suspected opioid dealers, the 
dominant cultural narrative surrounding people who take opioids is sympathetic.13 In 
contrast to the negative rhetoric that characterized the crack cocaine crisis—most 
prominently the demonization of pregnant women of color who used crack14—and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. DRUG POL’Y ALL., AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY DRUG-INDUCED 
HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE (2017) (“Although data are 
unavailable on the number of people being prosecuted under these laws, media mentions of 
drug-induced homicide prosecutions have increased substantially over the last six years. In 
2011, there were 363 news articles about individuals being charged with or prosecuted for 
drug-induced homicide, increasing over 300% to 1,178 in 2016.”). Drug-induced homicide 
statutes include, for example: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(3) (West 2017); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-3-102(e) (West 2018); FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(3) (West 2017); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/9-3.3 (West 2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(3) (West 2017); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 750.317a (West 2018); MINN. STAT. § 609.195(b) (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:35-9 (West 2018); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT ANN. § 2506(a) (West 2018); 11 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 11-23-6 (West 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a)(2) (West 2018); VT. STAT. 
ANN. TIT. 18, § 4250(a) (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.415 (West 2018); WIS. STAT. 
§ 940.02(2)(a) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West 2017). 
 10. At present, a substantial minority of states have drug-induced homicide statutes. See, 
e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3.3 (West 2018) (“A person commits drug-induced 
homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or 
Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully 
delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person’s death is caused by the injection, 
inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance.”); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2018) (“Any person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses 
methamphetamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, phencyclidine or any other controlled 
dangerous substance classified in Schedules I or II, or any controlled substance analog thereof, 
in violation of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:35-5, is strictly liable for a death which results from 
the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance, and is guilty of a crime of the first 
degree.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West 2017) (“A person is guilty of drug induced 
homicide if: (i) He is an adult or is at least four (4) years older than the victim; and (ii) He 
violates W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(i) or (ii) or (b)(i) or (ii) by unlawfully delivering a controlled 
substance to a minor and that minor dies as a result of the injection, inhalation, ingestion or 
administration by any other means of any amount of that controlled substance.”). 
 11. Valena Beety, The Overdose/Homicide Epidemic, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 983, 990 
(2018). 
 12. Eric A. Johnson, Rethinking the Presumption of Mens Rea, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
769, 776 (2012). 
 13. See Valarie K. Blake, Engaging Health Insurers in the War on Prescription 
Painkillers, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 485 (2017). 
 14. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 7–27 
(2011) (discussing how the racialization of the crack epidemic fed a criminal justice response, 
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heroin users in the 1950s and 1960s derided as “junkies,”15 today’s opioid discourse 
tends to avoid excessively harsh judgment of users. Commentators instead highlight 
the genetic component of opioid misuse;16 advocates point to science showing that 
addiction is a disease,17 arguing that as a result people who misuse opioids deserve 
treatment instead of punishment.18 Elected officials stress the culpability of 
pharmaceutical companies for aggressive marketing, and physicians for profligate 
prescribing.19 Social scientists link opioid addiction to the high unemployment rate 
and personal isolation in areas where it is most widespread. 20 They argue for more 
                                                                                                                 
 
highlighting the political advantages of racializing the crack epidemic, and providing statistics 
and data on the effect racialization had in the criminal justice system); Craig Reinarman & 
Harry G. Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror: Deconstructing Drug War Mythology, 31 
SOC. JUST. 182, 191–94 (2004) (describing hysteria about “crack babies” and noting that the 
notion that babies whose mothers used crack cocaine during pregnancy were severely at risk 
was misguided); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of 
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1481 (1991) (noting racist 
media portrayal of pregnant Black women and “crack babies”). 
 15. Glenn Ellis, The Forgotten Opioid Epidemic: African Americans and Heroin, THE 
PHILADELPHIA TRIBUNE (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.phillytrib.com/news/health/the 
-forgotten-opioid-epidemic-african-americans-and-heroin/article_7903ffc9-9f8c-5d2c-88a7 
-26b36952dc6d.html [https://perma.cc/5U9D-JJHW] (noting that heroin users in 1960s were 
punished harshly and arguing that such punishments were seen as socially acceptable because 
users were primarily Black and poor). 
 16. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek Gentler War on 
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/us/heroin-war-on 
-drugs-parents.html [https://perma.cc/LCD3-P2VL]; NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & CASEY 
ANDERSON, OPIOIDS: TREATING AN ILLNESS, ENDING A WAR 19 (2017) (“[I]n  content  and  in  
visual  framing,  media coverage of the current opioid crisis portrays it as  an  outside  threat  
and  focuses  on  treatment  and  recovery, while stories of heroin in the 1970s and crack-
cocaine in the 1980s focused on the drug user’s morality.” (citation omitted)).  
 17. Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial 
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1518 (2004) (noting that the notion of addiction as 
disease is controversial but that it does have some support from the medical community). 
 18. See, e.g., Brief for the Probationer on a Reported Question and on Appeal from a 
Finding of Probation Violation from the Concord Division of the District Court Department 
at 2, 4, 6, Commonwealth v. Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911 (Mass. 2018) (arguing that “science now 
recognizes that drug addiction . . . is not caused by moral turpitude but rather is a chronic brain 
disease whose defining feature is the compulsive use of a substance despite significant 
substance-related problems” and that “punishing relapse is clinically contraindicated” 
(citations omitted)); America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-landscape [https:// 
perma.cc/6WT7-4G59] (noting that most Americans believe drug users deserve treatment, not 
punishment).  
 19. See Blake, supra note 13, at 485 (noting that a sympathetic portrayal arises in part 
because many users initially obtained the drugs lawfully).  But see Maia Szalavitz, The 
Terrifying New Trend in Heroin Addiction, VICE (Oct. 17, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www 
.vice.com/en_us/article/qvjgvb/the-terrifying-new-trend-in-heroin-addiction (noting that the 
trend is changing so that more users are moving straight to heroin and bypassing prescription 
painkillers). 
 20. Olga Khazan, The Link Between Opioids and Unemployment, ATLANTIC (Feb. 18, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/04/joblessness-and-opioids/523281 
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drug treatment and overdose prevention for users.21 Policymakers and journalists 
highlight the fact that opioid addiction affects white,22 young23 suburbanites.24 These 
references to race and class work to differentiate opioid addiction in the popular 
imagination from drug scourges from the last five decades, which instead primarily 
affected poor people of color,25 thereby justifying—however implicitly—the calls 
for a response to the opioid crisis that lies outside the criminal system.26  
                                                                                                                 
 
/ [https://perma.cc/32T6-UZW5] (noting scholars who document high rates of unemployment 
where opioid misuse is highest); Sam Quinones, Guns and Opioids Are American Scourges 
Fueled by Availability, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018 
/02/24/opinion/sunday/guns-opioids-availability.html [https://perma.cc/J8R8-SZ22] (noting 
isolation of white opioid users). 
 21. Michael J. Zoorob & Jason L. Salemi, Bowling Alone, Dying Together: The Role of 
Social Capital in Mitigating the Drug Overdose Epidemic in the United States, 173 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 1 (2017).   
 22. German Lopez, The Opioid Epidemic Has Now Reached Black America, VOX (Dec. 
22, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/12/22/16808490/opioid 
-epidemic-black-white [https://perma.cc/97GJ-QULB] (citing statistics from the Centers for 
Disease Control indicating that “[w]hite people still suffer a greater rate of overdose deaths, 
and, as a majority of the population, they still make up much more of the raw total of overdose 
deaths”). 
 23. Szalavitz, supra note 19 (noting that “[b]y now, many Americans have heard sad 
stories that begin with a white teen innocently ingesting a prescription obtained from a 
pharma-influenced doctor” (emphasis omitted)). Some scholars warn that exclusively 
critiquing the ways that race defines state responses to drug epidemics understates the 
important role played by class in shaping criminal justice policy. See, e.g., Rebecca Tiger, 
Race, Class, and the Framing of Drug Epidemics, CONTEXTS (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://contexts.org/articles/race-class-drugs [https://perma.cc/FR4P-T2AM] (warning against 
“exclusive focus on racial inequality in drug policy”). 
 24. Andrew Cohen, When Heroin Hits the White Suburbs, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 
12, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/12/when-heroin-hits-the 
-white-suburbs [https://perma.cc/B825-BLGU] (noting that “[t]he Center for Disease Control 
says the cheap, easily accessible drug is attracting affluent suburbanites and women”); Elijah 
Wolfson, Prescription Drugs Have Pushed Heroin into the Suburbs, NEWSWEEK (May 28, 
2014, 6:21 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/prescription-drugs-have-pushed-heroin-suburbs 
-252625 [https://perma.cc/C3S7-4EVE] (noting that heroin is affecting the “most posh and 
desirable suburbs in the country”). 
 25. Seelye, supra note 16 (describing sympathetic portrayal of white opioid users and 
citing Kimberle Crenshaw arguing “one cannot help notice that had this compassion existed 
for African-Americans caught up in addiction and the behaviors it produces, the devastating 
impact of mass incarceration upon entire communities would never have happened”). 
 26. See, e.g., Ed Stetzer, “‘Lock Them Up:’ My Double Standard in Responding to the 
Crack Crisis vs. the Opioid Epidemic, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/10/26/lock-them-up-my-double-standard 
-in-responding-to-the-crack-crisis-vs-the-opioid-epidemic/?noredirect=on&utm_term= 
.e2d1559b8dec [https://perma.cc/A5F5-92Y2] (“In our rush to protect our communities, our 
families and our values, we sought to put distance between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ We made groups, 
constructed labels, and tried to do everything we could to separate what we perceived as the 
‘clean’ from the ‘unclean’—in many cases, the white from the black.”); Ekow N. Yankah, 
When Addiction Has a White Face, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/02/09/opinion/when-addiction-has-a-white-face.html [https://perma.cc/B6JA-ZN36] 
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Against this backdrop of a spike in fatal overdoses and a more compassionate 
attitude toward opioid users, a growing number of police departments have moved 
away from the use of arrest, detention, and initiation of criminal proceedings as the 
primary means for addressing violations of drug-possession statutes.27 Instead, these 
departments have adopted one of two distinct approaches, each of which incorporates 
public-health perspectives on drug use and addiction.28 The first is a pre-booking 
program through which officers refer low-level alleged offenders to community-
based social services with an aim of diverting them from the criminal system.29 The 
second form allows individuals to walk into a precinct or approach an officer in the 
community, relinquish their illicit drugs, and request admission to a detoxification 
program—typically without fear of arrest or prosecution.30 While not explicitly 
                                                                                                                 
 
(“[T]he national attitude toward drug addiction is utterly different [from the 1990s and e]ven 
Republican presidential candidates are eschewing the perennial tough-on-drugs speeches and 
opening up about struggles within their own families.”). 
 27. Scholars and elected officials from both parties have shifted toward a critical view of 
the War on Drugs. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6–7, 47–49, 53, 59 (2012); PETER MOSKOS, 
COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT (2008) (decrying war 
on drugs as a failure); Corey Booker, FACEBOOK (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.facebook.com 
/corybooker/videos/10157111094132228 [https://perma.cc/WD5U-LMF9] (“For decades, the 
failed War on Drugs has locked up millions of nonviolent drug offenders—especially for 
marijuana-related offenses—at an incredible cost of lost human potential, torn apart families 
and communities, and taxpayer dollars.”); Chris Christie, Face the Nation Transcripts June 7, 
2015: Christie, de Blasio, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation 
-transcripts-june-7-2015-christie-de-blasio [https://perma.cc/334W-MS2F] (“And I think, 
quite frankly, the war on drugs has been a failure . . . . And let’s stop spending money on 
incarcerating nonviolent people because they are drug-addicted.”).  
 28. See Elizabeth Joh, Imagining the Addict: Evaluating Social and Legal Responses to 
Addiction, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 175, 192 (2009) (noting that with respect to drug policing, 
traditionally, “[a] stark moralism tends to play a leading role in the perception of harm; other 
perspectives from public health and public policy, secondary roles”).  
 29. See Katherine Beckett, The Uses and Abuses of Police Discretion: Toward Harm 
Reduction Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 77, 86 (2016) (“Seattle’s Law Enforcement 
Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program is believed to be the first pre-booking diversion program 
for people arrested on drug and prostitution charges in the United States.”); see also Sara Jean 
Green, LEAD Program for Low-Level Drug Criminals Sees Success, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 9, 
2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/lead-program-for-low 
-level-drug-criminals-sees-success [https://perma.cc/Z8NL-XEXL] (explaining that the 
LEAD founders included prostitution as a qualifying offense because of data indicating that 
“[w]hile men are more likely to be arrested for using or selling drugs, women involved with 
drugs are most often arrested for prostitution”). 
 30. See, e.g., Brian MacQuarrie, “Angel” Opioid Initiative Thrives Despite Exit of 
Gloucester Police Chief, BOS. GLOBE (July 18, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com 
/metro/2017/02/21/angel-opioid-initiative-thrives-despite-exit-gloucester-police-chief 
/hvH14GgG0dRYTXJOpGEswO/story.html [https://perma.cc/SK9Z-FJCC] (describing that 
in 200 police agencies in twenty-eight states, departments have adopted an approach through 
which people who come to the police department and ask for help for drug addiction will be 
taken to a hospital and later placed in a recovery program and noting that some departments 
also adopt a “‘no-arrest’” policy). 
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confined to opioids, these new police approaches reflect and reinforce the 
comparatively sympathetic popular view of opioid users.31 This Article therefore 
refers to them, collectively, as “opioid policing.” 
On the one hand, opioid policing seems like progress. Its use of social services 
programs to divert people from the criminal system renders it less costly and more 
humane than War on Drugs policing, which included elements of militarization and 
has been characterized by a heavy reliance on arrest.32 These tactics in turn led to 
long prison sentences that disproportionately affected Black people—all with no 
reduction in the availability of illicit drugs.33 In addition, opioid policing improves 
upon the specialized, treatment-oriented drug courts created with the putative aim of 
providing treatment to drug users to stop the cycle of criminal offending. Such courts, 
which have proliferated in the last three decades, historically have demanded 
abstinence from participants, consigning them to jail or prison if they relapse.34 
Long-term outcomes for drug-court participants have been poor overall.35 By 
contrast, opioid policing programs do not necessarily terminate participation for, or 
consign to jail or prison, alleged offenders who relapse, or who do not stop using 
illicit drugs in the first instance.36 Instead, they adopt a harm-reduction philosophy 
that emphasizes attainment of housing, improvement of health, and avoidance of 
crime.37  
On the other hand, opioid policing retains troubling characteristics of each of 
these earlier state responses to illicit drug use. For one, the design and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. See, e.g., Hannah DelaCourt, Local Agencies Launch Program to Combat Opioid 
Crisis, STARNEWS ONLINE (May 17, 2017, 5:02 PM), http://www.starnewsonline.com 
/news/20170517/local-agencies-launch-program-to-combat-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc 
/6X9G-9J3Y] (“The Wilmington Police Department and six other agencies joined together 
Wednesday to take the first step in enacting a new program to address the opioid epidemic in 
the region.”); Shawna Newcomb, Bangor Launches Law Enforcement-Assisted Opioid 
Diversion Program, NEWS CTR. ME. (Mar. 1, 2017, 7:53 PM), http://www 
.newscentermaine.com/article/news/local/bangor-launches-law-enforcement-assisted-opioid 
-diversion-program/416973857 [https://perma.cc/US5N-HLCV] (referring to the LEAD 
program as an “innovative approach to Opioid Use Disorder and the criminal justice system”).  
 32. See, e.g., MARC MAUER, THE CRISIS OF THE YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALE AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (describing how police targeting of low-wealth areas, 
disproportionately populated by people of color, created and exacerbated racial disparities in 
incarceration for drug offenses, especially crack cocaine offenses).  
 33. See infra notes 159–78 and accompanying text. The enforcement of prohibition laws 
proved equally costly and difficult, as noted in THE NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & 
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENF’T OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 78–
109 (1931). 
 34. See infra notes 193–251 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra notes 262–69 and accompanying text. 
 36. Jag Davies, Expanding Drug Courts Won’t Help Ease the Opioid Crisis, STAT (Nov. 
1, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/11/01/drug-courts-opioid-crisis/ [https://perma.cc 
/2QY7-CHWR] (critiquing drug courts for “respond[ing] to the predictable relapses of drug-
dependent individuals by kicking them out of treatment and locking them up in jail” and 
arguing that expanding drug courts, as suggested by the White House Opioid Commission, 
will not help end the opioid overdose epidemic). 
 37. Beckett, supra note 29, at 77.  
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implementation of some opioid policing programs create incentives for law 
enforcement to expand, rather than reduce, surveillance of historically marginalized 
populations.38 In addition, opioid policing has the potential to create significant racial 
and socioeconomic disparities in terms of who benefits most.39 Indeed, careful 
analysis of opioid policing reveals the limitations of drug-reform efforts situated 
within law enforcement as well as the power and reach of the contemporary carceral 
state. 
This Article is the first to analyze each version of opioid policing.40 It contributes 
to two separate yet related strands of criminal-law scholarship. It speaks first to the 
literature that explores how arrest and prosecution are tools not only for responding 
to crime but also for managing populations. Such work documents the harms of 
arrest41 and prosecution42—even absent conviction—and argues that the 
contemporary criminal system is problematically functioning as a mechanism of 
social control that exacerbates distributional inequities and troubling power 
dynamics.43 The Article also interacts with scholarship that imagines a supportive 
state, outside the criminal apparatus, that can more effectively address, if not prevent 
outright, the wide variety of social ills currently within the purview of the criminal 
system.44  
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. See infra notes 372–420 and accompanying text. 
 39. See infra notes 421–30 and accompanying text. 
 40. Two legal scholars have analyzed the programmatic development and early operation 
of the Seattle LEAD program. See Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 165 (2013); Beckett, supra note 29. No legal scholar has yet considered the 
second form of opioid policing. 
 41. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 307 (2016) 
(“Given their costs, arrests should be used only when they serve an important state interest; 
yet, they often happen even when no such interest exists”); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 
67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 809 (2015) (arguing that civil regulatory bodies that make decisions 
based on arrests can pool resources with prosecutors and police officers, achieving a level of 
enforcement neither could achieve alone, and describing this phenomenon as undermining 
important aims of the criminal justice system); Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, ALA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (noting 
ways in which arrest has become fused with guilt and outlining harms of this fusion). 
 42. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 611, 615 (2014) (noting data showing that as misdemeanor arrests in New York City 
rose, convictions fell and asserting that this result suggests that a managerial model of justice 
has replaced an adjudicative one that functions to manage people over time through 
engagement with the criminal justice system). 
 43. Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, MICH. L. REV. 3 
n.11 (forthcoming 2019) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal) 
(“‘[S]ocio-legal theories of power, social control, race, and institutional structure better 
explain the criminal process and predict its outcomes.’” (quoting Alexandra Natapoff, The 
Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 71 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra 
Natapoff eds., 2017))). 
 44. See, e.g., Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
405, 405 (2018) (noting with approval how the Movement for Black Lives’ policy platform 
advocates “shrinking the large footprint of policing, surveillance, and incarceration and 
shifting resources into housing, health care, jobs, and schools” and urging legal scholars to 
engage with this vision); Allegra McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out previous state responses to illicit 
drug use upon which opioid policing improves—War on Drugs policing and drug 
courts—and identifies the harms, costs, and limitations of each of these responses. 
After sketching the contours of the contemporary opioid crisis, Part II argues that a 
new theory of systemic discretion has emerged in the departments practicing opioid 
policing. It then considers each form of opioid policing in detail. Part III analyzes the 
promise of opioid policing. Part IV discusses its limitations.  
I. PREVIOUS STATE RESPONSES: MAPPING THE CRITIQUES 
A. War on Drugs Policing  
1. A Tough-on-Crime, Racialized Politics  
U.S. policymakers have referenced and relied on racial stereotypes in crafting 
drug legislation at least since the beginning of the twentieth century.45 A 
paradigmatic example is the federal government’s response to opium users during 
this time period. Notably, both middle-class white people—particularly women—
and Chinese immigrants used the drug. Middle-class whites typically could easily 
obtain prescriptions from doctors and ingest the drugs in the privacy of their homes.46 
Chinese immigrants, by contrast, mostly obtained opium by visiting smoking dens 
in urban areas.47 In 1909, Congress passed the Opium Exclusion Act, which targeted 
only opium smokers.48 The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, enacted five years later, 
made explicit that only medical professionals could legally dispense opiates.49 Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 
L. REV. 1156 (2015) (arguing for a prison abolitionist ethic, which entails gradual 
decarceration and a substitution of other regulatory forms to address the social ills that we 
currently allocate to policing). For arguments that the state should change to better support 
families and that liberal democratic theory must take more seriously human dependency, see 
MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S 
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring 
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).   
 45. REBECCA TIGER, JUDGING ADDICTS: DRUG COURTS AND COERCION IN THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 28 (2013); Erik Luna, Drug War and Peace, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 833–38 
(2016) (providing examples of racialization in drug policy). 
 46. TIGER, supra note 45; Luna, supra note 45, at 834. See generally DAVID T. 
COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA (2001) 
(tracing patterns of opiate addiction and comparative treatment based on race and class in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s).  
 47. TIGER, supra note 45, at 29. 
 48. 21 U.S.C. §§ 176–85 (1909) (repealed 1970); CAROLINE JEAN ACKER, CREATING THE 
AMERICAN JUNKIE: ADDICTION RESEARCH IN THE CLASSIC ERA OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 13 
(2002) (noting that the Act banned the importation, possession, and smoking of opium). 
 49. Luna, supra note 45, at 829–30 (also noting that the Harrison Act sought to obtain 
revenue for the federal government); see also ACKER, supra note 48, at 34 (“The Harrison Act 
ended a period in which any substance could be packaged and sold as a medicine to the general 
public.”); Laws: A History of Opiate Laws in the United States, NAT’L ALL. ADVOCATES FOR 
BUPRENORPHINE TREATMENT, https://www.naabt.org/laws.cfm [https://perma.cc/PW9C 
-LF6P]. 
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Chinese immigrants faced sanctions for using the same drugs that white citizens 
could easily obtain from a physician, often even for a non-medical use.50 These laws 
corresponded with rising xenophobic sentiment; many hoped the Opium Exclusion 
Act might persuade immigrants to “go back to China.”51  
 Around this same time, marijuana legislation was also being driven by negative 
perceptions of people of color, with whom the drug was most closely associated.52 
At the state and federal level, legislators argued for marijuana’s criminalization by 
drawing upon racist stereotypes.53 Mexican laborers in the Southwest became 
associated with marijuana smoking, which was in turn blamed for their perceived 
lawlessness.54 Arguing in support of a marijuana criminalization statute in Texas, 
one senator in 1908 opined: “All Mexicans are crazy, and this stuff [marijuana] is 
what makes them crazy.”55 
By 1971, President Nixon was declaring drug abuse “public enemy number one” 
and committing his administration to an “all-out offensive” to end it.56 As articulated 
by the Nixon Administration, the War on Drugs had two, ostensibly equally 
important goals: reducing demand through prevention and rehabilitation programs, 
and curtailing supply through interdiction and other law enforcement initiatives.57 
Nixon’s proposed federal budget that year actually allocated more money for 
prevention than law enforcement. 58  
The National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), created in 1974,59 was founded on 
the principle that addiction is a disease that is amenable to treatment;60 the NIDA’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Federal law enforcement interpreted the Act as prohibiting prescriptions solely to 
maintain an addiction, but middle-class patients could circumvent this prohibition. ACKER, 
supra note 48, at 34 (citation omitted); Luna, supra note 45, at 830–31. 
 51. Luna, supra note 45, at 834 (citation omitted). 
 52. Jordan Cummings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled 
Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510, 518–19 (2015) (noting 
association in the public mind between marijuana and “Mexican, west Indians, Blacks, and 
underworld whites”). 
 53. Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the 
“War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 412 n.244 (2002) 
(stating “political interest in maintaining the connection between drugs and race has been a 
central theme of drug prohibition from the outset” (citation omitted)). 
 54. Steven W. Bender, Joint Reform?: The Interplay of State, Federal, and Hemispheric 
Regulation of Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
359, 361–2 (2013). 
 55. Id. (documenting enactment in western states of laws prohibiting marijuana). 
 56. Conor Friedersdorf, The War on Drugs Turns 40, ATLANTIC (June 15, 2011), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/the-war-on-drugs-turns-40/240472 [https:// 
perma.cc/C64R-XRPL]. 
 57. Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323, 1328–29, 1331 (2016).  
 58. MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX 112 (1998) (noting that Nixon proposed a federal drug 
budget that allocated $105 million of $155 million to treatment); see also TIGER, supra note 
45, at 29.   
 59. NAT’L INST. HEALTH, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.nih.gov/about 
-nih/what-we-do/nih-almanac/national-institute-drug-abuse-nida [https://perma.cc/CS6S 
-5VF3]. 
 60. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, UNDERSTANDING DRUG USE AND ADDICTION, 
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existence stood for the proposition that drug users were deserving of rehabilitation.61 
A Supreme Court case from a decade earlier had already recognized that the 
condition of being addicted to drugs could not constitutionally be punished through 
a criminal prosecution.62 
Notwithstanding this stated commitment to treatment, the federal emphasis 
quickly shifted to supply-side efforts. The Nixon Administration apparently 
perceived political benefits in overstating the public-safety threat posed by illicit 
drugs and employing a rhetorical strategy that linked this threat to racial minorities. 
This strategy drew on racialized tropes from the previous five decades.63 Successive 
presidential administrations from both parties64  have moved even farther from an 
emphasis on treatment and prevention and toward punishment as the preferred mode 
for addressing drug-law infractions, drawing on the historically entrenched 
stereotypes linking drugs to people of color and people of color to crime.65  
The tough-on-crime, racialized politics leading up to and following the War on 
Drugs declaration has dramatically altered criminal sentencing.66  Most states 
                                                                                                                 
 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/understanding-drug-use-addiction 
[https://perma.cc/2887-4ENJ] (last updated June 2018).  
 61. The Science of Drug Abuse and Addiction: The Basics, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/media-guide/science-drug-abuse-addiction-basics 
[https://perma.cc/96UD-BVG8] (last updated July 2018).   
 62. Robinson v. California invalidated a state statute that purported to criminalize the 
condition of being addicted to drugs. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).   
 63. See, e.g., Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How To Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S (Apr. 
2016), https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all [https://perma.cc/G59J-TMEK] 
(describing 1994 interview with John Ehrlichman, President Nixon’s domestic policy advisor, 
in which Ehrlichman said, “The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after 
that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people . . . . We knew we couldn’t make it 
illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies 
with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt 
those communities . . . and vilify them night after night on the evening news”); Paul Butler, 
The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 
GEO. L.J. 1419, 1452 (2016) (also citing the Ehrlichman interview: “Look, we understood we 
couldn’t make it illegal to be young or poor or black in the United States, but we could 
criminalize their common pleasure . . . . We understood that drugs were not the health problem 
we were making them out to be, but it was such a perfect issue . . . that we couldn’t resist it” 
(alterations in original)). 
 64. See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS 
HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 28–29 (2014) (“Though 
popularly associated with the Republicans, from the outset both parties adopted a Southern 
strategy based on dog whistle racism . . . . Democrats themselves would soon pick up the 
whistle at the national level, especially in the figures of two Southern politicians, Jimmy Carter 
and Bill Clinton.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 65. See generally Dorothy Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist 
Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2017). For a recent exploration of how the Johnson 
Administration’s anti-poverty initiatives laid the groundwork for the contemporary carceral 
state, with a particularly disproportionate impact on people of color, see ELIZABETH HINTON, 
FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION 
IN AMERICA (2016). 
 66. Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, 
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lengthened terms of incarceration, passed mandatory-minimum legislation, and 
eliminated parole for drug offenses.67 One of the most notorious examples of the 
harsh new sentencing regime occurred in New York. There, the legislature enacted a 
set of statutes that became known as the Rockefeller Drug Laws.68 These included a 
provision for a fifteen-year-prison sentence for people convicted of selling two 
ounces or possessing four ounces of narcotics.69 Other states soon followed suit.70  
These long sentences are characterized by racial disparities.71 For example, at the 
federal level, Congress passed a law imposing significantly higher penalties for crack 
use (associated with Black people) than powder cocaine use (associated with 
whites).72 In New York, more than ninety percent of the people sentenced under the 
Rockefeller Drug Laws were Black or Latino—a number dramatically out of 
proportion to the percentage of drug-law offenders these groups constitute.73 
                                                                                                                 
 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline 
-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983 [https://perma.cc/ZVD8 
-YYER]. See generally KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF 
INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2004) (tracing the rise of the “tough 
on crime” movement from the right’s political strategy of making crime a national issue in the 
early 1970s to its usefulness to Democrats in the 1990s).  
 67. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 429 (2013) 
(“From 1980 to 2007, there was a roughly twenty-fold increase in the number of federal 
offenders imprisoned for drug offenses—from 4900 in 1980 to 98,675 in 2007. [And d]uring 
the same period, the number of arrests for sale and manufacture of drugs more than doubled, 
[and d]rug offenders began to receive longer sentences than before.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 68. See N.Y. PENAL LAW 220.00 (McKinney 2004). 
 69. Madison Gray, New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, TIME (Apr. 2, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888864,00.html [https://perma.cc/4EXH 
-DF57] 
 70. Joe Kennedy, Breaking Pitiful (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law 
Journal). Drug War sentencing practices manifest a “total incapacitation” theory of 
punishment. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v. 
Florida to Abolition of Life Without Parole, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH 
PENALTY? 282, 293 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (defining theory as 
“the idea that imprisonment is appropriate whenever an offender poses any degree of risk to 
the community”).   
 71. See infra notes 109–11, 126–33 and accompanying text. 
 72. See, e.g., ACLU, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL 
CRACK COCAINE LAW I (2006) (discussing the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which imposed 
five-year federal prison sentences for just five grams of cocaine, while for powder cocaine, 
distribution of 500 grams—100 times the amount of crack cocaine—carried the same 
sentence); Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (reducing 
the disparity from a 100:1 disparity to an 18:1 disparity). 
 73. Carl Hart, People Are Dying Because of Ignorance, Not Because of Opioids, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/people-are 
-dying-because-of-ignorance-not-because-of-opioids [https://perma.cc/FE9J-GHXN]. 
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2. Primacy of Arrest 
a. Incentives 
A critical component of the Reagan Administration’s continuation of the War on 
Drugs was massive funding expenditures to local police departments. Made possible 
by cuts to prevention and treatment,74 these expenditures facilitated increases in 
hiring of police officers and purchasing of equipment.75 Departments began to invest 
in military-grade equipment: armored vehicles, night vision goggles, ballistic 
helmets, tactical vests, televisions, cameras, computers, and even camping gear.76   
Along with the militarization of police departments came a growing reliance on 
arrest as the primary weapon in the War on Drugs—for which there existed both 
financial and cultural incentives. Certain federal grants were explicitly conditioned 
on the number of drug arrests conducted.77 While the Department of Justice required 
state and local agencies receiving federal funds to report on how many arrests they 
made and the numbers of prosecutions that followed,78 grantees were not required to 
report on whether people in need of drug treatment received it.79 These demands 
signaled the prioritization of the appearance of cracking down on illicit drug use and 
sale over improvement in or even measurement of drug treatment or public safety.80  
In addition to funding incentives, incentives of police culture exist as well. Police 
academies typically instill a “warrior” mentality in cadets.81 An officer with such a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. ALEX KREIT, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, TOWARD A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO 
DRUG POLICY 2–3 (2009), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Kreit-Issue 
-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SB3-MHSB] (“The guiding tenet of the ‘war on drugs’ strategy 
has been that vigorous enforcement of uncompromising criminal justice measures is the most 
effective method to reduce drug abuse and associated problems. This philosophy has 
manifested itself in an almost singular focus on supply-side initiatives, including the mass 
incarceration of drug offenders at all levels of offense severity in an effort to deter domestic 
drug manufacture and distribution . . . . Efforts aimed directly at demand reduction have largely 
followed the same approach by increasing the number of arrests for drug possession and 
addressing drug use and addiction problems primarily within the criminal justice system.”).   
 75. Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2184–85 (2016) 
(summarizing federal-state initiatives); see also Karena Rahall, The Green to Blue Pipeline: 
Defense Contractors and the Police Industrial Complex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1791 
(2015). 
 76. Rahall, supra note 75, at 1800 n.103. 
 77. Id. 
 78. INIMAI CHETTIAR ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING FUNDING TO 
REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION 4 (2013) (explaining how a federal grant program generated 
incentives to increase arrests, prosecutions, and incarcerations). Requirements also included 
reports on the amount of cocaine seized. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; see also NICOLE FORTIER & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
SUCCESS-ORIENTED FUNDING: REFORMING FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE GRANTS 1 (2015) 
(“Today, a complex web of federal crime-fighting grants funnels billions of dollars across the 
country . . . to encourage states to increase arrests, prosecutions, and incarceration, all in the 
belief that harsher punishment would better control crime.”). 
 81. Seth Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE 
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mentality sees himself as a uniquely skilled crime fighter, who must assume that the 
individuals he approaches are hostile and potentially life-threatening.82 A warrior 
mindset encourages a default to arrest when a citation or summons would suffice.83 
An emphasis on arrest and aggressive tactics reached its apex with “broken 
windows” policing.84 Described in a 1982 essay of the same name, broken windows 
policing is proactive, relying on arrests for low-level misdemeanors—including 
possessory drug offenses.85 The theory of this form of policing is that cracking down 
on “disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, 
addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed” deters more 
serious crime.86 Police departments deploy broken windows tactics in low-income, 
urban communities of color, populated by people with already negative experiences 
with police and who typically have insufficient social capital to resist.87  
Constitutional criminal procedure places few meaningful restraints on policing,88 
particularly policing of suspected drug-law offenders.89 Faced with an apparent and 
                                                                                                                 
 
FOREST L. REV. 611, 647 (2016). 
 82. In Paul Butler’s account, the problem is not only officer mindset but a series of 
Supreme Court cases that have shown great deference to officers when confronted with 
African American men, such that police have “super powers”—to arrest, racially profile, and 
kill. Butler, supra note 63, at 1446.  
 83. Harmon, supra note 41, at 334 (noting that criminal proceedings can be initiated 
through summonses and citations and need not begin with arrest).  
 84. Tom Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining the Goals 
of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2017); see also 
Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 872 (2015) (noting 
that commentators have coined different terms to describe this version of policing including 
“order-maintenance,” “hot-spot,” and “problem-oriented policing”). 
 85. James Q. Wilson & George F. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.  Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New 
Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO L. J. ONLINE 33, 38 (2017) (describing 
“proactivity” as core component of this form of policing and noting that it came to include a 
wide range of police tactics, including “vigorous enforcement of laws against relatively minor 
[misdemeanor] offenses”; the use of stop and frisk, or investigative stops; and drug 
enforcement) (citation omitted)  
 86. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 85, at 32.  
 87. Stoughton, supra note 81. At the federal level, the Department of Justice was creating 
policies on traffic stops that encouraged state troopers to engage in racial profiling of drivers. 
David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues that the U.S. Wrote the Book on Race Profiling, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/29/nyregion/new-jersey-argues 
-that-the-us-wrote-the-book-on-race-profiling.html (discussing Operation Pipeline federal 
program). 
 88. Stoughton, supra note 81, at 648 (“The Supreme Court has consistently privileged 
policing through its tendency to determine whether constitutional regulation is appropriate 
—and, if so, what type of regulation is appropriate—in part by assessing whether the proposed 
rule would burden law enforcement.”) (citation omitted). 
 89. Levin, supra note 75, at 2185–86 (“In their eagerness to combat drugs, the courts have 
departed from longstanding fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment protections . . . [and] 
upheld (1) vague and over-inclusive search warrants; (2) searches conducted in the absence of 
warrants and without either probable cause or individualized suspicion; (3) invasive hi-tech 
surveillance . . .; and (4) drug courier profiles, often including racial and ethnic characteristics 
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often unsympathetic drug dealer in a criminal prosecution, state and federal court 
judges seem to struggle to allow meritorious motions to suppress.90 Courts’ deference 
to the state in drug cases is great enough that scholars and jurists have identified a 
“drug exception” to the Bill of Rights.91 In response, commentators increasingly call 
for alternative, non-judicial modes of regulating the police generally, and in drug 
cases particularly.92 
These financial and cultural incentives for arrests predictably led to a dramatic 
spike in their occurrence. Between 1980 and 2009, the arrest rate for drug possession 
more than doubled;93 nearly 1.9 million such arrests occurred in 2006.94 In 2017, 
there were more than 1.5 million arrests for drug-law violations.95 The overwhelming 
percentage—eighty-five percent—were possessory offenses; of those, most were for 
marijuana possession.96  
b. Harms and Costs 
Drug-law arrests create myriad individual and social harms.97 And, as shown 
below, an arrest-first policy creates particular danger for people arrested in the throes 
of opioid addiction. 
                                                                                                                 
 
. . . .”) (quoting John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The 
National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 
578–79 (1991) (footnotes omitted)).   
 90. See generally Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 755–56 (2002) 
(noting that while constitutional criminal procedure theoretically does not observe distinctions 
among crimes, “numerous jurists and scholars have recognized that drug offenses receive 
exceptional treatment in the criminal justice system” and that “[l]egal commentators have 
likewise identified a ‘drug exception’ to the Bill of Rights created through judicial 
acquiescence to the activities of narcotics agents”). 
 91. Id. at 758.  
 92. Rachel Harmon argues that courts are institutionally ill-equipped to regulate the police 
and thus the reliance by reformers on constitutional criminal procedure to do so is misplaced. 
Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764 (2012) (asking “not 
how the Constitution constrains the police but how law and public policy can best regulate the 
police”). Others urge that constitutional criminal procedure should be seen not only as a means 
to regulate the police but also a method of facilitating resistance by the populace to the state. 
See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance: A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (2015) (“[C]onstitutional litigation creates a 
way in which non-state actors can keep raising the subject, and there is value even in noticing 
that the courts do not want to talk about it”). 
 93. HOWARD N. SNYDER, ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2009, at 9. 
 94. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS (2016), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm [https://perma.cc/H99G-S8N8] 
 95. 2017 Crime in the United States, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/persons-arrested 
[https://perma.cc/23AQ-CAAS]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Drug-war policing practices trouble both progressives and conservatives. Compare 
Butler, supra note 63 (discussing pretextual stops and suspicion-less frisks), with Anthony L. 
Fisher, The Disposable Life of a 20-Year-Old Confidential Informant, REASON, (June 15, 
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i. Individual 
Even when it does not result in conviction,98 an arrest ushers in adverse 
consequences.99 The severity of these consequences suggests, as Anna Roberts 
argues, “an assumption of guilt (or an assumption that one’s likelihood of guilt is far 
higher than the low threshold that probable cause suggests).”100 These include 
governmentally imposed consequences, consequences imposed by private entities, 
and stigma.101 Governmentally imposed consequences include a widely accessible 
record that can be difficult, if not impossible, to seal or expunge; probation or parole 
violations; civil asset forfeiture; threats to rights of child custody; bans on receiving 
public benefits; and, in some cases, adverse findings in legal cases when a judge uses 
a prior arrest record to refuse to grant relief to which a defendant would otherwise be 
eligible.102 Suspension from school can also result.103 Burdens imposed by private 
entities include refusal to hire and other forms of workplace discipline.104 Publication 
of “mug shots” and the “perp walk”—the coordinated law enforcement and media 
display of arrestees—bring humiliation and shame.105  
Each of these consequences endures upon conviction, which brings with it an 
additional array of negative impacts.  Convictions that do not involve jail or prison 
sentences still create life altering harms, such as exclusion from the labor market and 
loss of voting rights.106 The process of arrest and prosecution leads to significant 
costs and fees—for probation, attorneys, general court costs, and incarceration 
itself—which can multiply when an individual is unable to pay, subjecting her to 
protracted entanglement in the criminal system, and sometimes additional penalties 
                                                                                                                 
 
2015), http://reason.com/reasontv/2015/06/15/the-disposable-lives-of-confidential-inf 
[https://perma.cc/Y5ZK-PMYG] (criticizing reliance on confidential informants. 
 98.  See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 42, at 641 (“[A]rrest without conviction is not only 
possible, but is the norm.”). 
 99. Roberts, supra note 41, at 13–17 (summarizing consequences). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 13. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Legal Rights, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH (Aug. 3, 2018), http://jfcy.org/en 
/rights/suspensions [https://perma.cc/T3DE-RVJC]. 
 104. Roberts, supra note 41, at 14. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, EVERY 25 SECONDS: THE HUMAN TOLL OF 
CRIMINALIZING DRUG USE IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2016) (“Each day, tens of thousands more 
are convicted, cycle through jails and prisons, and spend extended periods on probation and 
parole, often burdened with crippling debt from court-imposed fines and fees. Their criminal 
records lock them out of jobs, housing, education, welfare assistance, voting, and much more, 
and subject them to discrimination and stigma.”).  
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such as loss of driver’s licenses.107 All told, the consequences accompanying arrest 
and conviction can render full participation in civic life nearly impossible.108  
The negative impacts of drug arrests and convictions are not spread evenly or 
equitably throughout the population.109  Although data show relatively similar levels 
of illicit drug use among Black people and other racial groups—and a higher 
tendency of whites to become dependent on drugs—police officers enforce the drug 
laws in racially disproportionate ways.110 Between 1980 and 2000, for example, the 
national Black drug arrest rate increased from roughly 6.5 to 29.1 (per 1000 persons), 
while the white drug arrest rate increased much more modestly, from approximately 
3.5 to 4.6 (per 1000 persons).111   
Arresting and detaining people with addiction to opioids112 creates significant 
health dangers. Deprived of access to the drugs, users can quickly become 
dehydrated.113 Withdrawal-induced dehydration can be treated with intravenous 
fluids.114 However, people who are jailed while addicted do not always receive 
access to this care.115 Even when such care is available, jails frequently lack sufficient 
numbers of trained staff to effectively monitor its provision.116 While no organization 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. See generally Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-
Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1487–89 (2016) (surveying the 
array of “criminal justice costs, fines, fees, restitution, surcharges, and interest”). In a landmark 
victory, a federal district court judge, within the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction, 
ruled that the state of Tennessee may no longer revoke driver’s licenses for failure to pay fines 
and fees and found that “suspending licenses without an effective, non-discretionary safety 
valve for the truly indigent violates both equal protection and due process principles.” 
Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-cv-01263, 2018 WL 2862772, at *53 (M.D. Tenn. June 11, 
2018). 
 108. Roberts, supra note 41, at 13–17; see also Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal 
Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1417–19 (2018) (noting that notwithstanding the enormous 
negative impact wrought by these consequences, no agency is tasked with systematically 
ensuring accuracy of these records, or correcting them when they are wrong). 
 109. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 79 
(1995); see also Hannah LF Cooper, War on Drugs Policing and Police Brutality, 50 SUBST. 
USE & MISUSE 1188 (2015) (describing disparities in Black arrests for drug use and noting that 
drug arrests were more racially disparate than arrests in other offense categories); supra note 
87 and accompanying text. 
 110. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM 2009 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: 
MENTAL HEALTH FINDINGS 24 fig.2.12 (2009) (noting that 8.8% of blacks, compared to 9.6% 
of whites, reported using an illicit drug within the past month); Maia Szalavitz, Study: Whites 
More Likely to Abuse Drugs than Blacks, TIME (Nov. 7, 2011), http://healthland.time.com 
/2011/11/07/study-whites-more-likely-to-abuse-drugs-than-blacks [https://perma.cc/7YSA 
-M5EN] (summarizing data from National Survey on Drug Use and Health). 
 111. Beckett, supra note 29, at 81. See also supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 112. For a definition of opioids, see infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text. 
 113. Julia Lurie, Go to Jail. Die from Drug Withdrawal. Welcome to the Criminal Justice 
System, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 5, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics 
/2017/02/opioid-withdrawal-jail-deaths [https://perma.cc/EDW7-NV2L]. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Blake, supra note 13, at 489. 
 116. Lurie, supra note 113. 
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tracks how many people have died from drug withdrawal in jail, at least twenty 
lawsuits were filed between 2014 and 2016 alleging that an inmate died from 
complications from opioid withdrawals—a number likely representing just a fraction 
of such deaths.117 This number is on top of deaths from overdose that occur in jails 
from opioids brought in at the time of arrest or smuggled in later.118 
Given that drug-law convictions continue to account for a significant portion of 
the people sent to jail and prison each year,119 public-health experts call for drug 
treatment, including medication-assisted treatment (MAT) and overdose prevention, 
to be available for and accessible to people in jails and prisons; however, out of 3200 
jails around the country, only 23 provide MAT to people who are detained, and of 
the 50 state prison systems, only 4 do so.120 States historically are unwilling to fund 
drug treatment for incarcerated people121  because of misguided but persistent notions 
that “nothing works” for drug offenders.122 These policy decisions ignore the reality 
that a person with untreated addiction upon release from jail or prison is particularly 
vulnerable to relapse.123 And post-release relapses are extremely dangerous, as users 
often return to the dose they were using prior to jail or prison—which is more than 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Timothy Williams, Opioid Users Are Filling Jails: Why Don’t Jails Treat Them?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2017, at A14.  
 119. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2016, at 1 (2018) 
(showing the rise of prison population from the 1980s). Scholars disagree about the extent to 
which drug cases contribute to mass incarceration. Compare ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF 
PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1–6 (2011) (blaming drug 
prosecutions for prison growth in New York), with John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A 
Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (noting little 
empirical support for such claims). 
 120. See, e.g., Beth Schwartzapfel, A Better Way to Treat Addiction in Jail, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Mar. 1, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/01/a-better 
-way-to-treat-addiction-in-jail [https://perma.cc/T8UA-9EX7]; see also infra note 182 and 
accompanying text (defining medication-assisted treatment as the use of medications in 
combination with behavioral and counseling therapies for substance use disorders). 
 121. JENNIFER BRONSON, JESSICA STROOP, STEPHANIE ZIMMER & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, 
DRUG USE, DEPENDENCE, AND ABUSE AMONG STATE PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2007–
2009 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudaspji0709.pdf [https://perma.cc/APU3 
-HB5R]. 
 122. Gregory P. Fallin, Harry K. Wexler & Douglas S. Lipton, Drug Treatment in State 
Prisons, in TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS (1992), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books 
/NBK234751 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/6DBT-KQ2K]. 
 123. Megan McLemore, Prisons Are Making America’s Drug Problem Worse, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/11/prisons-are-making-
americas-drug-problem-worse [https://perma.cc/3M6M-3427] (explaining how the lack of 
treatment options for inmates increases the harmful effects of incarceration); Aaron D. Fox et 
al., Release from Incarceration, Relapse to Opioid Use and the Potential for Buprenorphine 
Maintenance Treatment: A Qualitative Study of the Perceptions of Former Inmates with 
Opioid Use Disorder, 10 ADDICT. SCI. CLIN. PRAC, no. 2, 2015, at 2 (finding that nearly three 
quarters of people with opioid use disorder relapsed to heroin use within three months of 
release from prison).  
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their bodies can tolerate.124 The risk of fatal overdose is particularly acute in the two 
weeks after release from jail or prison.125 
ii. Social  
Along with harm to individuals, the “arrest first” policing of the War on Drugs 
has imposed negative community-wide impacts in the low-income neighborhoods of 
color where it is practiced. A heavy police presence and aggressive tactics makes 
entire communities feel under siege, regardless of any particular individual’s 
wrongdoing,126 creating environments akin to a “hornet-like invasion where [young 
males of color] are barraged with questions such as ‘where’s the weed?’ and ‘where’s 
the guns?’”127 Environments characterized by arbitrary and heavy-handed policing 
can, according to procedural justice scholars, undermine community members’ sense 
that police officers are acting legitimately128 Those who perceive policing as 
illegitimate are less likely to follow the law.129 By the procedural justice account, 
then, tough-on-crime policing practices from the War on Drugs fail as mechanisms 
of deterrence.  Even assuming that heavy police presence can deter illicit drug use, it 
is far from clear that arrest is an officer’s best mechanism for doing so. Rather than 
acting solely as “apprehension agents”130 officers could equally if not more 
effectively deter and respond to crime through the issuance of criminal citations or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. Williams, supra note 118. 
 125. Schwartzapfel, supra note 120; see also Shabbar I. Ranapurwala et al., Opioid 
Overdose Mortality Among Former North Carolina Inmates: 2000–2015, 108 AM J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1207, 1207–09  (2018) (noting that, within two weeks of their release, heroin overdose 
death risk among former inmates was seventy-four times as high as non-incarcerated North 
Carolina residents, respectively). 
 126. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE 
L.J. 2054, 2087–88 (2017). See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and 
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 
462 (2000) noting that “the implementation of Broken Windows policies was 
disproportionately concentrated in minority neighborhoods and conflated with poverty and 
other signs of socio-economic disadvantage”); I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and 
Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1254–55 (2017) (discussing examples of racially 
disproportionate policing tactics). 
 127. Kimberly D. Bailey, Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U. 
CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 1557 (2014). 
 128. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS, at xiv (2002) (ebook) (describing “procedural 
justice” as “the belief that legal authorities are entitled to be obeyed and that the individual 
ought to defer to their judgments” the importance of fair process to respect of the law and 
describing such 
 129. Id. at 49–75, 141–51 (finding that deference to legal authorities is shaped by 
procedural justice and trust in the motives of legal actors, and that minority group members 
are less willing to defer to the decisions made by legal authorities as well as less likely to 
report that their experiences with legal authorities are procedurally fair and unbiased). 
 130. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 237–
40 (2013) (arguing that police deter more effectively as “sentinels” than as “apprehension 
agents”). 
2019] OPIOID POLICING  409 
 
even warnings.131 Beyond questions of deterrence, the aggregate impact of decades 
of War on Drugs policing in low-income communities of color has been a profound 
sense of cultural dislocation and cynicism—what Monica Bell calls “legal 
estrangement”132 and which she identifies as galvanizing the organized resistance of 
groups like Black Lives Matter.133 
In addition to these human costs, the War on Drugs has exacted great financial 
costs. Over $50 billion are expended each year at the federal, state, and local level.134 
Well over half of that is spent on supply-side efforts, such as policing and arrests, 
and interdiction.135 In 2018, the National Drug Control budget included an additional 
$1.4 billion for international spending and $5 billion for interdiction efforts.136 The 
high rates of incarceration that have resulted from the War on Drugs have placed 
significant strain on the budgets of states, which have cut critical spending on 
education and social services as a result.137  
While Congress in 2018 allocated three billion dollars for the opioid crisis, some 
of which is designated for treatment, experts argue that this amount is inadequate.138 
The shredding of the social safety net and disinvestment in treatment options over 
the last several decades underlies the current treatment gap in which only one in four 
people with opioid use disorder receive specialty care and only twelve percent of 
adults who need treatment for any substance use disorder receive it.139 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Harmon, supra note 41 (arguing that arrest is overused). 
 132. Bell, supra note 126, at 2086–87 (arguing that because “the law’s purpose is the 
creation and maintenance of social bonds[,] [a]n emphasis on inclusion implies concerns not 
only about how individuals perceive the police and the law (and thus whether those individuals 
cooperate with the state’s demands), but about the signaling function of the police and the law 
to groups about their place in society”). 
 133. Id. at 2088 (“[S]hifting the orientation of legitimacy theory from governmental power 
to social inclusion is one way that theory can better capture the concerns of activists in the era 
of Black Lives Matter”); see also Akbar, supra note 44, at 412–18 (noting the rebellions in 
Ferguson and Baltimore and the formation of Black Lives Matter). 
 134. DRUG POL’Y ALL., supra note 9.  
 135. Id. 
 136. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT’L DRUG CONTROL BUDGET (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/FY2018-Budget 
-Highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBP4-56K8]. 
 137. See, e.g., MICHAEL MITCHELL & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, CHANGING PRIORITIES: STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS AND INVESTMENTS IN 
EDUCATION 1 (2014) (showing the correlation between increasing prison costs and decreasing 
spending on public education). 
 138. See, e.g., German Lopez, Congress’s Omnibus Bill Adds $3.3 Billion to Fight the 
Opioid Crisis. It’s Not Enough, VOX, (Mar. 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy 
-and-politics/2018/3/22/17150294/congress-omnibus-bill-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc 
/FDA8-9LQK] (citing experts). 
 139. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., FACING 
ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE SURGEON GENERAL’S SPOTLIGHT ON OPIOIDS 8 (2018), https:// 
addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/Spotlight-on-Opioids_09192018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RJG-6SFP]; see also LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE 
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 197–208 (2009) (explaining mass 
incarceration of African Americans as a response to the destruction of the social safety net). 
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The inefficacy of the War on Drugs is apparent in the fact that decades of 
militarized policing, arrest, prosecution, and long prison sentences have not reduced 
illicit drug use.140 Illicit drugs are now generally cheaper and more potent than before 
the War on Drugs began.141 What is more, they remain widely accessible.142   
B. Specialized Drug Courts 
The harms, costs,  and inefficacy of the War on Drugs have spurred a rethinking 
and rejection of its tenets.143  One popular local reform effort is the specialized drug 
court. One of the many so-called “problem-solving” courts144 to emerge in the last 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. Numerous studies suggest that there is no relationship between harsh criminal 
penalties and reductions in illicit drug use. See, e.g., Jim Parsons & Scarlet Neath, Minimizing 
Harm: Public Health and Justice System Responses to Drug Use and the Opioid Crisis, VERA 
INST. JUSTICE (Dec. 2017), https://www.vera.org/publications/for-the-record-public-health 
-justice-system-responses-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/B2F7-L662]. 
 141. DAN WERB, THOMAS KERR, BOHDAN NOSYK, STEFFANIE STRATHDEE, JULIO 
MONTANER & EVAN WOOD, THE TEMPORAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DRUG SUPPLY 
INDICATORS: AN AUDIT OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS 3 (2013), 
https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/3/9/e003077.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ3N 
-TPZ5] (“With few exceptions and despite increasing investments in enforcement-based 
supply reduction efforts aimed at disrupting global drug supply, illegal drug prices have 
generally decreased while drug purity has generally increased since 1990. These findings 
suggest that expanding efforts at controlling the global illegal drug market through law 
enforcement are failing.”).  
 142. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., HEALTH, 
UNITED STATES, 2016, 213 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus16.pdf#050 
[https://perma.cc/T3CL-FAAC] (showing continued use of drugs and current rates of drug use 
in America); Daniel Denvir, The Opioid Crisis Is Blurring the Line Between Victim and 
Perpetrator, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2018) (quoting drug policy expert Leo Beletsky stating “[w]e 
have consistently invested in punishment and repression, while our health and social safety 
nets have crumbled. Over time, crackdowns and incarceration supposed to dismantle drug 
trafficking organizations have made illicit drug supplies cheaper, purer, and more readily 
available”), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/the-opioid-crisis-is-blurring-the 
-legal-lines-between-victim-and-perpetrator.html [https://perma.cc/D2PB-LMQX]. 
 143. Voters Have Little Faith in War on Drugs, RASMUSSEN REPS. (Jan. 10, 2018), 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/january_2018/vot
ers_have_little_faith_in_war_on_drugs [https://perma.cc/7HSR-6T9H] (finding that only 
nine percent of “likely U.S. voters” think the United States is winning the War on Drugs); see 
also Rethinking America’s War on Drugs as a Public-Health Issue, 357 LANCET 971, 971 
(2001) (editorial) (noting a 2001 Pew survey in which fifty percent of those surveyed said drug 
use should be considered a disease not a crime and that fifty-eight percent of those younger 
than thirty years expressed this view); supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 144. See, e.g., SUPER. CT. OF CAL., COUNTY OF ORANGE, COLLABORATIVE COURTS (2017), 
http://www.occourts.org/directory/collaborative-courts [https://perma.cc/XQ7Z-A7XK] 
(defining problem-solving courts as “specialized court tracks that address underlying issues 
that may be present in the lives of persons who come before the court on criminal, juvenile, or 
dependency matters,” including mental health courts, girls’ courts, and veterans’ courts).  
Some commentators have criticized the term “problem-solving” for being presumptuous and 
overly ambitious.  See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and 
2019] OPIOID POLICING  411 
 
thirty years, drug courts started in Florida in 1989.145 They have spread to every state 
and currently number over three thousand.146 
In a drug court, an offender who would otherwise face a jail or prison sentence is 
given an opportunity to avoid it. To do so, she must plead guilty to the underlying 
offense and then successfully complete a court-ordered monitoring and rehabilitation 
regimen during the pendency of the suspended sentence,147 which may include  
outpatient and sometimes inpatient treatment; random drug screens; and intensive 
supervision by probation officers, including an order to avoid re-arrest.148 Frequent 
court appearances occur, at which the judge, typically adopting an inquisitorial 
role,149 scolds or praises, depending on probation reports on treatment progress and 
the offender’s attitude about her addiction.150 The adversarial positions of criminal 
court collapse, and defense attorneys, prosecutors, and probation officers operate as 
a “team.”151 Success means court supervision ends; failing to complete the 
requirements leads to the imposition of the sentence.  
While drug courts have won praise across the political spectrum—tough-on-crime 
conservatives appreciate the incarceration threat, while liberals support the notion of 
rehabilitation152—the courts at the same time are riddled with problematic features 
that complicate their most ambitious claims. For one, they rest on theoretical 
premises about addiction and its treatment that are contraindicated by public-health 
and scientific findings.153 In addition, they operate according to an understanding 
about the link between drug dependency and criminal activity that is contested.154 
Finally, notwithstanding their therapeutic trappings, they remain firmly entrenched 
                                                                                                                 
 
Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1606 n.72 (2012) (describing the 
decision to instead use the term “problem-oriented” as a way of suggesting that courts may 
not in fact solve the problems they set out to solve). 
 145. Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial 
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1488 (2004). 
 146. TIGER, supra note 45, at 17. 
 147. Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 603 (2016). 
While a small number of drug courts operate part of a deferred prosecution and thus prior to 
the taking of a guilty plea, most contemporary drug courts employ a post-plea model. See 
TIGER, supra note 45, at 21. 
 148. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NEITHER JUSTICE NOR TREATMENT: DRUG COURTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2017); Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 783, 806 (2008). 
 149. Bowers, supra note 148, at 784. 
 150. TIGER, supra note 45, at 19; see also Eaglin, supra note 147, at 603 (describing drug 
courts’ abandonment of the traditional adversarial proceeding of criminal court adjudications). 
 151. For an exemplary critique of how defendants are ill-served by this non-adversarial 
structure, see Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway—Musings of a Public Defender 
About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 55–56, 61–63 
(2000). 
 152. Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 
425 (2009). 
 153. See infra notes 193–235 and accompanying text. 
 154. See infra note 244–52 and accompanying text. 
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within the criminal system.155 As a result, participants too frequently suffer many of 
the same harmful life outcomes as people prosecuted outside of drug court.156  
1. The Problem with Compulsory Treatment 
The notion of addiction as a chronic and relapsing disease of the brain increasingly 
finds support in the medical and public-health establishment.157 The growing public 
acceptance of this view surely has reduced the stigma that has long attached to users 
of illicit drugs.158 That drug addiction is a disease is an ideological pillar of drug 
courts.159  
It might seem that if addiction is a disease, one of the features of which is relapse, 
then the use of criminal sanctions for relapse could constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.160 Yet defense attorneys have not prevailed in making such arguments. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2018 rejected a claim by a probationer 
that a jail sanction for relapse when she was ordered to remain drug-free violates the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. See infra notes, 254–76, and accompanying text; see also Michael M. O’Hear, 
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 157. See Nora D. Volkow, George F. Koob & A. Thomas McLellan, Neurobiologic 
Advances from the Brain Disease Model of Addiction, 374 N. ENG. J. MED. 363 (2016) 
(reviewing neurobiological evidence showing the link between brain function and addiction); 
supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (noting that the National Institute on Drug Abuse 
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 158. See, e.g., Brief for the Probationer on a Reported Question and on Appeal from a 
Finding of Probation Violation from the Concord Division of the District Court Department 
at 4, Commonwealth v. Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911 (Mass. 2018) (arguing that “science now 
recognizes that drug addiction . . . is not caused by moral turpitude but rather is a chronic brain 
disease whose defining feature is the compulsive use of a substance ‘despite significant 
substance-related problems’”); id. at 2–3 (citing Alfred Prentice, The Problem of the Drug 
Addict, 76 J. AMERICAN MED. ASS’N 1551, 1556 (1921) (noting that “unfortunates suffering 
from narcotic addiction [were] weak-minded deteriorated wretches, mental and moral 
derelicts, pandering to morbid sensuality; taking a drug to soothe them into dream states and 
give them languorous delight; held by us all in despite [sic] and disgust, and regarded as so 
depraved that the rescue is impossible and they unworthy of its attempt”). 
 159. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BJA DRUG COURT DISCRETIONARY GRANT 
PROGRAM: FY 2011 REQUIREMENTS RESOURCE GUIDE 3 (2011) (“Drug court practitioners 
understand that drug addiction is a complex, chronic, relapsing disease.”).. 
 160. David Sack, 5 Ways We Punish Addicts – and Why We Should Stop, PSYCHOL. TODAY 
(Oct.13, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/where-science-meets-the 
-steps/201410/5-ways-we-punish-addicts-and-why-we-should-stop [https://perma.cc/SE6E 
-3FPD] (“Substance use disorders are not just a criminal justice issue, but also a major public-
health concern. Decades of research demonstrate that addiction is a disease of the brain — one 
that can be prevented, treated, and from which people can recover.”).  
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Eighth Amendment,161 relying on the U.S. Supreme Court case that found  criminal 
behavior arising from intoxication was properly subject to criminal punishment.162  
Drug court proponents and practitioners reconcile what seems to be a 
contradiction between a disease framework and the imposition of criminal 
punishment. They do so through a belief that “tough love” in the form of criminal 
sanctions can best motivate a drug user to manage her illness and maintain 
sobriety.163 Indeed, the whole point of a drug court is to “capitalize on the trauma of 
arrest” in order to show the drug user that even more serious criminal consequences 
can follow if the drug use does not cease.164 Judges will impose a set of graduated 
sanctions—periods of “flash” incarceration and, eventually, imposition of a jail or 
prison sentence—when the addicted person relapses or is otherwise believed to be 
out of compliance with the mandated treatment.165 Drug court ideology holds, then, 
that criminal tools can have therapeutic benefits.166  
While this belief in the usefulness of coerced treatment is a hallmark of drug 
courts—an administrator’s statement that “force is the best medicine” for treating 
addiction is emblematic of this thinking167—recent scientific findings do not support 
it. The notion that people who seek treatment only to avoid the imposition of a 
criminal sanction are more motivated to complete it than people who enter treatment 
voluntarily is increasingly contested.168 A recent evaluation of drug court data reveals 
that “the limited literature on this subject did not, on the whole, suggest improved 
outcomes from compulsory treatment, with some studies suggesting harms.”169  
What is more, the dominant drug court framework does not make room for the 
body of research suggesting that people who abuse and become addicted to drugs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 161. Commonwealth v. Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911, 917 (Mass. 2018). 
 162. Id. at 919 (“There can be no question of the authority of the State . . . to regulate the . 
. . use  of . . . drugs [through, inter alia] a program of compulsory treatment for those addicted 
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Process, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017 
/12/opioids-massachusetts-supreme-court/548480/ [https://perma.cc/M7UQ-ZPVL] (quoting 
Harvard Medical School psychiatry professor John Kelly arguing against notion that drug 
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 164. TIGER, supra note 45, at 20. 
 165. TIGER, supra note 45, at 108–10. 
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 168. TIGER, supra note 45, at 108–10.   
 169. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 19 (noting a 2016 study); D. Werb, 
A. Kamarulzaman, M.C. Meacham, C. Rafful, B. Fisher, S.A. Strathdee & E. Wood , The 
Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systematic Review, 28 INT. J. DRUG POLICY  
9 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4752879 [https://perma.cc/NVW3 
-BTCY].  
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often do so because of a lack of “competing re-inforcers.”170 This social science 
scholarship complicates the disease narrative by noting that both the crack and opioid 
crises have occurred disproportionately in low-income communities among 
individuals with few affordable sources of purpose or pleasure.171 As one 
commentator puts it, “[i]f you’re living in a poor neighborhood deprived of options, 
there’s a certain rationality to keep taking a drug that will give you some temporary 
pleasure.”172 Notwithstanding the evidence of sociocultural factors underlying 
addiction, drug courts maintain an individualistic paradigm with an emphasis on 
personal responsibility.173  
2. The Problem of the Abstinence Imperative 
Drug courts rest on a commitment to abstinence.174 Some disallow even certain 
prescribed medications.175 While a single relapse may not result in termination of 
probation and imposition of a jail or prison sentence, drug court administrators must 
believe that the offender is progressing in her commitment to abstinence.176 A refusal 
to accept that one is an addict and needs treatment can count against a participant; 
the discretion of a drug court judge is more likely to be deployed negatively against 
an offender with a perceived poor attitude.177  
The corollary of the drug court’s abstinence imperative is skepticism about the 
principles and practices of harm reduction.178 Harm reduction accepts that some  
illicit drug use is inevitable.179 Its strategies center on reducing the negative effects 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. See, e.g., Carl L. Hart, As With Other Problems, Class Affects Addiction, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/02/10/what-is-addiction/as-
with-other-problems-class-affects-addiction [https://perma.cc/D4VP-SSSS] (arguing that 
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 171. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 170. 
 172. John Tierney, The Rational Choices of Crack Addicts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/science/the-rational-choices-of-crack-addicts.html 
[https://perma.cc/5AWJ-R3R7] (citation omitted) (arguing that crack use was best seen as a 
symptom rather than a cause of unemployment and other social ills). 
 173. TIGER, supra note 45, at 107. 
 174. Id. at 136–38 (noting that the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, the 
primary advocacy group for drug courts, highlights ensuring abstinence as one of ten key 
components of the U.S. drug court model).   
 175. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 13. 
 176. TIGER, supra note 45, at 9. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 136–38. 
 179. Karen Mary Leslie, Harm Reduction: An Approach to Reducing Risky Health 
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of drug use, and the philosophy rests on tenets of public health rather than criminal 
justice.180 Its practices include needle exchanges, safe injection sites, and distribution 
of the overdose-reversing drug Naloxone, among others.181 Rather than seek to 
eradicate all illicit drug use, harm reduction proponents accept the likely continuation 
of illegal drug use and seek to minimize its secondary harms.182  
The skepticism among drug-court practitioners about harm reduction sometimes 
extends even to medication-assisted treatment, despite its clear benefits for people 
who are addicted.183 MAT comprises medications such as buprenorphine, 
methadone, and naltrexone184 administered in conjunction with behavioral and 
counseling therapies. MAT medications help people addicted to opioids by 
eliminating psychological cravings without inducing withdrawal symptoms.185 They 
make overdose-related death significantly less likely;186 MAT is more effective than 
either medication or behavioral therapy alone.187 Notwithstanding these benefits, 
many drug court practitioners are opposed to MAT.188 One source of opposition is 
the belief that provision of overdose-reversing medications to drug addicts 
incentivizes illicit drug use189 and that this risk outweighs its benefits in reducing the 
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-epidemic-end [https://perma.cc/4SED-MJW3]. 
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T. Hall, Jordan Wilfong, Ruth A. Huebner, Lynn Posze & Tina Willauer, Medication-Assisted 
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Welfare System, 71 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT  63 (2016) (MAT users involved in the 
child welfare system were more likely to retain custody of their children than those not using 
MAT).   
 188. Matusow et al., supra note 183, at 478. 
 189. VERA, supra note 180 (citing an expert noting that a commonly shared misconception 
among drug court administrators is that equipping drug users with naloxone incentivizes 
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likelihood of fatal overdose.190 In addition, some drug courts discourage MAT use 
because of stigma191 derived from the notion that MAT is simply “replac[ing] one 
addiction with another.”192 Another misconception is that MAT negatively affects 
cognitive capacity and basic functioning.193 A final barrier to widespread adoption 
of MAT is that the medications can be prohibitively costly and difficult to obtain194 
—particularly in rural areas.195  
3. The Problem of an Exclusive Emphasis on Addiction 
An additional premise of drug courts is that a participant’s addiction leads to 
criminal activity, including commission of violent crime, if it is not cured.196 The 
inverse of this premise is that curing addiction will eliminate criminal activity. These 
beliefs in turn reinforce the abstinence imperative.197 Yet the link between addiction 
and criminality is not as certain as drug-court ideology would suggest. And, 
inasmuch as there is a connection between drug use and crime, it is difficult to 
discount the many negative social and economic factors—homelessness and 
unemployment, for example—that frequently accompany addiction and that may 
equally explain criminal activity.198  
Shima Baradaran explains: 
The literature generally suggests that criminal activity is neither an 
inevitable consequence of illicit drug use (apart from the illegal 
 nature of drug use itself) nor [is illicit drug use] a necessary or sufficient 
condition for criminal behavior. Many illegal drug users commit no other 
kinds of  crimes, and many persons who commit crimes never use illegal 
drugs. Furthermore, even when people commit crimes while using illegal 
drugs, there may not be a causal connection between the two.199 
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 196. Eaglin, supra note 147, at 603.   
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 198. See Elizabeth C. Prom-Wormley, Jane Ebejer, Danielle M. Dick & M. Scott Bowers, 
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 199. Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 273 n.235 (2015) 
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Despite this literature, drug courts maintain a near-exclusive focus on preventing 
drug use and curing addiction. The rehabilitation discourse of drug court emphasizes 
personal responsibility to the exclusion of addressing economic and social factors 
that contribute to, and exacerbate the harms of, addiction.200 Drug court probation 
officers work  to move users away from a so-called drug “lifestyle” and acculturate 
within them a work ethic perceived to be absent.201 And when the drug-court 
participant does not fulfill the probation conditions intended to move her to sobriety, 
criminal consequences result.202  
4. The Vetting Problem 
 The drug court process can be protracted, invasive, and demeaning, with 
paternalistic judges inquiring into personal details of participants’ lives and making 
demands frequently unrelated to the underlying charge.203 Drug court practitioners 
and proponents justify these features because they believe drug courts offer critical 
and otherwise inaccessible rehabilitation and treatment to people who will benefit 
from it.204   
The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. A foundational 2008 critique of drug 
courts found that the courts were less likely to enroll individuals who were 
legitimately drug-dependent or addicted than they were to accept people seeking a 
drug-court placement simply to avoid incarceration.205 Insufficient vetting of 
defendants can lead to enrollment of defendants simply trying opportunistically—
and understandably—to game the system to avoid jail or prison rather than because 
they legitimately have a drug addiction problem that could benefit from treatment.206 
In addition, even when vetting occurs, drug court personnel may inappropriately 
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 203. Tiger, supra note 23. 
 204. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 151, at 53. 
 205. Bowers, supra note 148, at 833. 
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equate an individual’s self-reported drug use with drug abuse.207 Such mistakes are 
not surprising, given that the evaluations of potential enrollees are typically done not 
by trained physicians but by drug court staff; decisions about the participants’ failure 
or success are made not by addiction specialists but by judges, who similarly equate 
use with abuse.208 
The pressure on drug courts to show that they are effective in reducing recidivism 
creates incentives for administrators to select clients likely to successfully complete 
the program. Yet, as described above, these are not necessarily the clients most in 
need of treatment.209 A further example of “cherry picking” clients can be found in 
the fact that drug courts often enroll only individuals with no criminal record—or at 
least no prior convictions of violent crimes.210 This exclusion makes little sense in 
the face of considerable evidence that the highest-risk offenders in terms of criminal 
records in fact make the best use of the kind of rehabilitative intervention found in 
the drug court.211  
Similarly, drug courts tend to accept people charged only with possessory 
offenses.212 However, this restriction belies the fact that the line between those who 
distribute drugs and those who use them is sometimes conceptually thin and 
therapeutically meaningless. For example, many drug users sell to support their own 
drug dependency.213 In addition, drug users frequently share drugs with friends or 
family members, and they all may take them together.214  
For those drug-court participants who fail, the jail or prison sentence that is 
imposed is typically longer than the sentence that was offered pursuant to a proposed 
plea deal at the outset of criminal proceedings.215 Unfortunately and predictably, 
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those who end up in jail or prison are likely to be from the same marginalized 
populations as those negatively affected by War on Drugs policing.216 
5. Absence of Accountability 
Drug courts thus far remain popular, notwithstanding their ideological and 
operational problems. Part of the reason for their popularity likely is that their actual 
success rates are difficult to determine, such that drug-court proponents’ claims come 
to be accepted as true. Drug courts escape scrutiny at least in part because the 
National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) is both an organized 
advocacy group for drug courts and their primary evaluator.217 This fact helps explain 
some of the slipperiness of the drug court data that its proponents offer.218 For 
example, the quantitative evaluation tools used for drug courts purport to show that 
these courts work in saving money and reducing recidivism.219 Yet these evaluations 
in fact focus only on drug court participants who graduate, eliding any mention of 
the 30%–70% of participants who fail to make it that far.220 In addition, the 
evaluations have not examined how drug court participants would fare in a 
community-based supervision program operated entirely separately from the 
court.221  
Finally, while drug courts require the participant to alter his or her conduct, there 
is no corresponding mechanism to hold courts accountable when they provide 
substandard treatment and services. And recent studies show that many drug courts 
are indeed substandard. Human rights activists have documented that the treatment 
provided through drug courts is not evidence-based. In addition, they note instances 
of drug court administrators violating participants’ confidentiality rights.222  
II. OPIOID POLICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
This Part identifies and describes a local law enforcement approach that departs 
from and in important ways improves upon tenets and practices of both War on Drugs 
policing and the specialized drug court—what the Article refers to as “opioid 
policing.”  Section A provides a brief overview of the history, nature, and scope of 
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the contemporary opioid crisis.223 Section B discusses the theory of systemic 
discretion underlying opioid policing and provides a detailed description of its two 
primary forms.  
A. Overview of the Opioid Crisis 
Opioids are a class of drugs that includes pain relievers available legally by 
prescription, such as oxycodone, marketed as OxyContin; hydrocodone, marketed as 
Vicodin; codeine; morphine; the illegal drug heroin; and synthetic products such as 
fentanyl and carfentanil.224 Each is chemically related and interacts with opioid 
receptors on nerve cells in the body and brain, producing pain relief and euphoria.225  
While opioid misuse was not uncommon in the twentieth century,226 today’s 
opioids are significantly more ubiquitous and deadlier. Their widespread availability 
can be traced to a short study published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 
1980, which reviewed records of patients prescribed opioids while in the hospital and 
found that most of those patients did not become addicted.227 Notwithstanding its 
small sample size and limited scope, this report catalyzed a change in a near-
century’s worth of conventional wisdom that opioids should be prescribed sparingly, 
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opioids/528840/ [https://perma.cc/KP2N-4WWT] (describing a small study in which a 
physician and his graduate assistant claimed, from examining hospital records, that “despite 
widespread use of narcotic drugs in hospitals, the development of addiction is rare in medical 
patients with no history of addiction”). 
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and only on an in-patient basis.228 Pharmaceutical companies, Purdue Pharma in 
particular, began an aggressive marketing campaign to persuade physicians that 
prescribing opioids on an out-patient basis was sound practice.229 The result of these 
developments has been a high rate of opioid prescription, one that is unique to the 
United States.230  
Prescription opioids can quickly produce dependency and addiction.231 What is 
more, a recent study found that 1 of every 550 patients started on opioid therapy died 
of opioid-related causes just over two years after the first prescription.232 This fact 
led the Center for Disease Control to conclude “[w]e know of no other medication 
routinely used for a nonfatal condition that kills patients so frequently.”233  
Dependency and addiction are concentrated in smaller cities and towns, 
particularly in the Rust Belt.234 From 2007 to 2012, pharmaceutical companies 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. Id. This reluctance to prescribe opioids can be traced to the period immediately 
preceding the passage of the Harrison Tax Act, when physicians worried about the 
addictiveness of opioids. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 229. For book-length treatments of this history, see, e.g, BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: A 
“WONDER” DRUG’S TRAIL OF ADDICTION AND DEATH (2003); SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND 
(2015).  
 230. See, e.g., Christina J. Hayhurst & Marcel E. Durieux, Opioid Overdose: The Price of 
Tolerance, SCI. AM. (Aug. 9, 2016), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/opioid-
overdose-the-price-of-tolerance [https://perma.cc/S2ZC-NX8A] (noting that Americans 
represent only seven percent of the world’s opioid consuming population, yet use around 56% 
of the world’s opioids); Keith Humphreys, Americans Use Far More Opioids Than Anyone 
Else in the World, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/15/americans-use-far-more-opioids-than-anyone-else-in-the 
-world/?utm_term=.cc650f5fe087 [https://perma.cc/9RDT-JBDT] (citing data from the 
United Nations and noting that Americans are prescribed six times as many painkillers as 
citizens of Portugal and France, even though those countries ensure more widespread access 
to health care); America’s Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and Prescription Drug Abuse: 
Hearing before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG 
ABUSE (May 14, 2014), https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities 
/testimony-to-congress/2014/americas-addiction-to-opioids-heroin-prescription-drug-abuse 
[https://perma.cc/PU75-A5VH] (noting that prescriptions in the United States account for 
almost 100% of the world total for Vicodin and 81% for oxycodone).  
 231. See, e.g., Jessica Wapner, CDC Study Finds Opioid Dependency Begins Within a Few 
Days of Initial Use, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/cdc-
opiate-addiction-572498 [https://perma.cc/8LHU-Z3PT] (“Even at relatively low doses and 
low duration of opioid use, the risk of long-term use and dependency begins to escalate very 
early on.”).  
 232. Id. (noting that the proportion was as high as 1 in 32 among patients receiving high 
doses). 
 233. Thomas R. Frieden & Debra Houry, Reducing the Risks of Relief — The CDC’s 
Opioid-Prescribing Guideline, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1501, 1503 (2016). 
 234. Nicole Colson, Prescribing Crisis, JACOBIN (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag 
.com/2017/04/opioid-crisis-addiction-workers-pharmaceuticals-trump [https://perma.cc 
/CS85-85LE] (noting the epidemic in the Rust Belt, connecting it to “decades of economic 
decline, population loss, infrastructure decay, and declining living standards”); see also 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Drug Overdose Deaths (2016), https://www.cdc 
.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/AN7C-5DF2] (noting that  in 2016, 
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shipped more than 780 million doses of hydrocodone and oxycodone to West 
Virginia—approximately 433 pain pills for every person in the state.235 Nearly half 
the working-age men who are out of the labor force are taking pain medication, 
primarily opioids.236 Likely because of a historic reluctance of physicians to 
prescribe necessary pain medication to Black people,237 the initial wave of fatal 
overdoses from prescription medication mostly affected white people.238 Overdose 
deaths from opioids continue to rise, and deaths from heroin and synthetic opioids 
such as fentanyl now outpace those from prescription opioids.239  
In addition to the obvious tragic human cost of overdose-related deaths, opioid 
addiction and overdose place tremendous strain on the social safety net. Recent years 
have seen a spike in emergency room visits for symptoms relating to opioid addiction 
withdrawal.240 From 1997 to 2011, the number of people seeking treatment for 
addiction went up 900%,241 with demand dramatically exceeding supply.242 After 
                                                                                                                 
 
the states with the highest rates of death due to drug overdose were West Virginia (52 per 
100,000), Ohio (39.1 per 100,000), New Hampshire (39 per 100,000), the District of Columbia 
(38.8 per 100,000) and Pennsylvania (37 per 100,000)).  
 235. Colson, supra note 234. 
 236. Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 397, 433 (2017); see also Alex Hollingsworth, 
Christopher J. Ruhm & Kosali Simon, Macroeconomic Conditions and Opioid Abuse (Nat’l. 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23192, 2017) (noting macroeconomic 
conditions and arguing that “[w]ith the increased availability of prescription opioids (and 
reductions in heroin prices), it seems likely that consumption of these drugs rise when 
economic conditions worsen and that some of this increased use leads to adverse outcomes 
including emergency department visits or death”). 
 237. Steven Ross Johnson, The Racial Divide in the Opioid Epidemic, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160227 
/MAGAZINE/302279871 [https://perma.cc/N36L-M5F3] (stating that doctors prescribe 
opiates to blacks less frequently due to racial bias and quoting the director of Physicians for 
Responsible Opioid Prescribing as saying, “It would appear that the prescriber may be more 
concerned about the possibility of the patient getting addicted or maybe the possibility that the 
pills will be diverted and sold on the street if the patient is black. If the patient is white, they 
may feel like there’s nothing to worry about . . . .”); see also Kelly K. Dineen, Addressing 
Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context: Synchronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple 
Complex Public Health Problems, 40 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 20 (2016) (“Disparities in pain 
treatment also reflect ingrained biases based on gender, race, socioeconomic status, and other 
perceived differences.”).   
 238. Lopez, supra note 22 (noting that while white Americans still die disproportionately 
from opioid overdose-related deaths, the gap between whites and other racial groups is 
narrower with heroin and other illicit forms of the drug than for prescription drugs). 
 239. Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Aug. 2018), https:// 
www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc 
/QK6N-2K4K]. 
 240. Alexander et al., supra note 2, at 560.  
 241. Id. 
 242. Christine Vestal, Still Not Enough Treatment in the Heart of the Opioid Crisis, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRS. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis 
/blogs/stateline/2016/09/26/still-not-enough-treatment-in-the-heart-of-the-opioid-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/U986-4XZ8] (citing government data showing “less than half of the 2.2 
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years of declining numbers, the child welfare population has increased by ten percent 
between 2012 and 2016 in conjunction with the worsening opioid crisis.243 Children 
removed from opioid abusers, often after the latter are arrested, face longer stays in 
foster care and require expensive long-term therapy and treatment.244 Morgues have 
run out of space for the bodies of people who died from opioids.245 Experts estimate 
that the economic cost of opioid misuse has been $500 billion per year, comprising 
lost productivity, additional spending on health care and social services, and criminal 
justice costs.246  
B. Addressing the Harms and Costs of Arrest 
The ubiquity and lethality of today’s opioid crisis have created space for a new 
law enforcement approach to alleged drug users. This approach has been shaped by 
advocates with social and political capital; some of its most effective  advocates are 
the white and upper-middle-class friends and family members of people with opioid 
addiction.247 They have pushed for a less punitive set of tactics and strategies in part 
                                                                                                                 
 
million people who need treatment for opioid addiction are receiving it”).   
 243. Angie Schwartz & Sean Hughes, On Child Welfare, an Insufficient Federal Response 
to the Opioid Epidemic, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://chronicle 
ofsocialchange.org/opinion/child-welfare-insufficient-federal-opioid-epidemic [https://perma 
.cc/2DRJ-6CQR]. 
 244. Perry Stein & Lindsey Bever, The Opioid Crisis Is Straining the Nation’s Foster-Care 
Systems, WASH. POST (July 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-opioid 
-crisis-is-straining-the-nations-foster-care-systems/2017/06/30/97759fb2-52a1-11e7-91eb 
-9611861a988f_story.html?utm_term=.0dcf22bc1f00 [https://perma.cc/4R5X-K5RJ]; see 
also Paula Seligson & Tim Reid, Unbudgeted: How the Opioid Crisis Is Blowing a Hole in 
Small-Town America’s Finances, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.reuters 
.com/article/us-usa-opioids-budgets/unbudgeted-how-the-opioid-crisis-is-blowing-a-hole-in 
-small-town-americas-finances-idUSKCN1BU2LP [https://perma.cc/JL68-QVAN]  (noting 
that in Ross County, Ohio, about seventy-five percent of the 200 children placed into state 
care in the county have parents with opioid addictions, up from about forty percent five years 
ago, and that this development has caused a near doubling in the county’s child services 
budget). 
 245. Tim Craig & Nicole Lewis, As Opioid Overdose Exacts a Higher Price, Communities 
Ponder Who Should Be Saved, WASH. POST (July 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/world/as-opioid-overdoses-exact-a-higher-price-communities-ponder-who-should-be 
-saved/2017/07/15/1ea91890-67f3-11e7-8eb5-cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html?utm_term= 
.60ab1f17c319 [https://perma.cc/FF2Q-D5CX].  
 246. Maria LaMagna, More Evidence that the Opioid Epidemic Is Only Getting Worse, 
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-much-the-opioid 
-epidemic-costs-the-us-2017-10-27 [https://perma.cc/GC5T-ND3X]. 
 247. A recently enacted federal statute reflects the more compassionate, treatment-oriented 
approach to the opioid crisis. The 2016 law provides for expanded access to naloxone among 
civilians as well as law enforcement, encourages awareness-raising around the misuse of 
opioid-based pain medication, and directs the Department of Justice to fund state and local 
initiatives that expand treatment alternatives to incarceration. See generally PHYSICIANS FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 7 (describing law and explaining change in political 
environment). 
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by emphasizing that addiction and overdose-related deaths occur across all races and 
socioeconomic classes.248  
A new mantra has emerged: “we can’t arrest our way out of this” is now a 
common assertion by law enforcement officials at the local, state, and federal 
levels.249 This statement likely indicates several things: first, that police officers can 
neither regulate nor reach the many drivers of the opioid crisis. These include over-
prescription by doctors,250 “pill mills,”251 improper marketing by pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 248. Yankah, supra note 26. 
 249. See, e.g., Caroline Preston, Don’t Lock ’Em Up. Give ’Em a Chance to Quit Drugs, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/opinion/dont-lock-em-up 
-give-em-a-chance-to-quit-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/954Z-M94W] (quoting Albany police 
chief, Brendan Cox: “We can’t keep arresting our way out of problems . . . . Isn’t that the 
definition of insanity — that you continue to do the same thing over and over and expect a 
different result?”); Charles Crumm, Deadly Addiction: ‘Can’t Arrest Our Way Out of This,’ 
OAKLAND PRESS NEWS (July 21, 2017), http://www.theoaklandpress.com/general 
-news/20170721/deadly-addiction-cant-arrest-our-way-out-of-this [https://perma.cc/U7U5 
-MMHM] (quoting Mike Bouchard, Oakland County Sheriff);  Carol Robidoux, NH Top 
Cops: ‘We Can’t Arrest Our Way Out’ of Oxy, Heroin Epidemic, MANCHESTER INK LINK, (Oct. 
11, 2014), https://manchesterinklink.com/nh-top-cops-cant-arrest-way-oxy-heroin-epidemic 
[https://perma.cc/C5VK-RGQN] (quoting Derry, New Hampshire, Police Chief, Ed Garone); 
Steve Birr, Comey Says US ‘Cannot Arrest Our Way Out of’ Opioid Epidemic,  DAILY CALLER 
(Mar. 2, 2017, 5:07 PM) http://dailycaller.com/2017/03/02/comey-says-us-cannot-arrest-our-
way-out-of-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/HE9F-LQP7] (quoting James Comey).  
 250. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 13, at 486 (arguing that “while criminal law certainly has 
its place in this epidemic, for example by targeting physicians who unlawfully abuse their 
prescriptions pads, prescription painkiller abuse is better handled by changes to how we 
regulate our healthcare system, in terms of both delivery and payment”); Erica Trachtman, 
Note, A Horrific Violation of Trust: Prosecuting Doctors for Patients’ Prescription 
Overdoses, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (2012), http://www.americancriminallawreview 
.com/aclr-online/horrific-violation-trust-prosecuting-doctors-patients-prescription-overdoses 
[https://perma.cc/L2PQ-FYAD] (stating the DEA “reports a steady rise in successful criminal 
prosecutions of physicians, from just 15 convictions in 2003 to 43 in 2008”); see also Barack 
Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 
859 (2017) (detailing efforts of Obama Administration). 
 251. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against 
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2014) (surveying individual and 
class action lawsuits, parens patriae lawsuits initiated by state attorneys general, and criminal 
prosecutions against pharmaceutical companies, prescribing physicians, and pharmacists; 
concluding that state attorneys generals’ suits have been the most effective; but arguing that 
litigation will be insufficient as a means to address the harms of overprescription and 
suggesting instead to use comprehensive prescription monitoring programs, anti-doctor 
shopping laws, and prescription drug “take back” initiatives).   
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companies,252 insufficient monitoring by pharmacies,253 and illegal importation of 
synthetic fentanyl.254 Second, some departments recognize that fear of arrest can 
deter or delay users from seeking help for someone they are with who is 
overdosing255—which can result in death.256 Third, the fact that so many white 
people, including upper and middle-upper-class white people,257 are addicted to 
opioids surely influences the sense among police departments that arrest is an 
inappropriate response.258  
Law enforcement officials know that their first encounter with a person misusing 
opioids frequently involves a response to a 911 call reporting an overdose, and that 
the opioid user may die without quick and life-saving action.259 Many people using 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. See Alana Semuels, Are Pharmaceutical Companies To Blame for the Opioid 
Epidemic?, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017 
/06/lawsuit-pharmaceutical-companies-opioids/529020 [https://perma.cc/746M-RHV9] 
(surveying recent lawsuits by attorneys general); see also Art Van Zee, The Promotion and 
Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 221, 224 (2009) (noting that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was limited 
in its oversight of the marketing and promotion of controlled drugs). 
 253. Ausness, supra note 251, at 1121. 
 254. See SEAN O’CONNOR, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, FENTANYL: 
CHINA’S DEADLY EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES 6 (2017) (“Chemical flows from China have 
helped fuel a fentanyl crisis in the United States . . . . Unlike previous opioid epidemics, 
including a temporary spike in U.S. fentanyl use in 2006 that was traced to a single clandestine 
lab in Mexico, fentanyl sold in the United States is now being processed by many individual 
distributors across the country. The diffused nature of the problem has made it difficult for 
law enforcement to contain.”). 
 255. This fear is likely to become more pronounced as more states enact and prosecutors 
enforce laws that make people who supply illicit drugs that lead to death eligible for homicide 
charges. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & CASEY ANDERSON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, OPIOIDS: 
TREATING AN ILLNESS, ENDING A WAR (2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2017/12/Opioids-Treating-an-Illness-Ending-a-War.pdf?eType=EmailBlast 
Content&eId=059ccf35-73cd-412d-a1a1-6c0006c4a5b2 [https://perma.cc/T7KN-X39R]. 
 256. In recognition of the opioid overdose crisis, nearly all states have enacted “Good 
Samaritan” laws, which permit or mandate legal amnesty for individuals who themselves 
would otherwise be exposed to criminal liability when they seek emergency assistance for 
people using drugs.  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, DRUG OVERDOSE IMMUNITY 
AND GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS (June 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal 
-justice/drug-overdose-immunity-good-samaritan-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HRV-SXSV]. 
 257. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 258. Scholars argue that along with derogation of people of color, preferential treatment of 
white Americans helps drive the stark disparities that define America’s criminal justice 
system.  See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoë Robinson, Implicit White 
Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871 (2015) (citing examples 
including the comparatively benign response to the methamphetamine epidemic as compared 
with the crack epidemic). 
 259. Margaret Talbot, The Addicts Next Door, NEW YORKER (June 5 & 12, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/06/05/the-addicts-next-door [https://perma.cc 
/97XV-DV99]. Officers today routinely carry the overdose-reversal medication naloxone. 
Opioid Overdose Reversal with Naloxone (Narcan, Evzio), NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Apr. 
2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/opioid-overdose-reversal-naloxone-narcan 
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opioids purchase and use them in their own homes or cars; they escape the police 
surveillance that would occur if they needed to purchase drugs in public spaces.260 
The lethality of contemporary opioid use exists in part because of ignorance among 
users about the contents of the drugs they are using.261 Without knowing, for 
example, if the heroin they are purchasing contains fentanyl, people are likely to use 
a more potent and frequently deadly amount.262 Unlike such countries as Belgium 
and Portugal, nowhere in the United States are there free, anonymous drug-purity 
testing services, which could provide this potentially life-saving information.263  
Much of what officers do in areas where the opioid crisis is the most severe is 
akin to social work—making referrals to treatment, providing grief counseling, and 
managing the removal of children from parents who have overdosed.264 As the 
following section demonstrates, many departments have begun to move away from 
providing these services on an ad hoc basis and instead systematically to shape 
officers’ discretion toward non-arrest mechanisms for responding to alleged drug-
law offenders.   
C. Shaping Police Discretion 
Officers have broad discretion when deciding how to handle the myriad situations 
they encounter during a shift: obvious and serious violations of the criminal law that 
require arrest; acts that are criminal but that an officer may decide to  respond to with 
a citation or warning rather than an arrest; and non-criminal issues—a mentally ill 
person not taking her medication or a person under the influence of drugs or alcohol 
and not acting in ways perceived as rational—that may nonetheless present as public 
safety problems and thus within the purview of law enforcement.265 While the crack 
                                                                                                                 
 
-evzio [https://perma.cc/B6S8-CE85]; see also Craig & Lewis, supra note 245 (noting that, 
according to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, thirty-eight states have implemented naloxone 
programs for police officers). 
 260. Ron Meyers, How the Opioid Boom Transformed Policing: We’re Not Just Making 
Arrests - We’re Caretakers, VOX (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/first 
-person/2017/3/30/15115066/opioid-epidemic-heroin-crisis-ohio-police [https://perma.cc 
/TSY3-3QT3] (quoting police chief in Chillicothe, Ohio, stating of the opioid crisis that “[i]t’s 
also a much more invisible addiction compared to drug booms of the past. People are shooting 
up in the privacy of their homes or cars”). 
 261. Carl L. Hart, People Are Dying Because of Ignorance, Not Because of Opioids, SCI. 
AM. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/people-are-dying-because 
-of-ignorance-not-because-of-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/7QFH-T4QT]. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Katie Zezima, As Opioid Overdoses Rise, Police Officers Become Counselors, 
Doctors and Social Workers, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/national/as-opioid-overdoses-rise-police-officers-become-counselors-doctors-and-social 
-workers/2017/03/12/85a99ba6-fa9c-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term= 
.21cb862ff5da [https://perma.cc/J4AT-QVDX] (“The nation’s opioid epidemic is changing 
the way law enforcement does its job, with police officers acting as drug counselors and 
medical workers and shifting from law-and-order tactics to approaches more akin to social 
work.”).  
 265. Beckett, supra note 29, at 78 (noting that police officers “routinely encounter both 
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cocaine crisis of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in large numbers of arrests of drug 
users, such a result was not inevitable. It was, instead, the result of deliberate policy 
choices flowing from state and federal incentives.266  
Competing theories about discretion—how to police, how much to police, and the 
proper aims of policing267—have preoccupied policymakers and scholars since the 
American Bar Foundation “discovered” the concept in the 1950s.268 Shaping police 
discretion involves not only forbidding certain acts but also providing guidance to 
officers as to which one from among several permissible options is most 
appropriate.269  
In the wake of grassroots activism,270 criticism from scholars,271 and successful 
class-action lawsuits,272 some police departments have slowly begun to reconsider 
the deployment of discretion toward encouraging arrest for minor criminal offenses, 
including drug offenses.273 The police killings of Eric Garner and Michael Brown—
                                                                                                                 
 
non-criminal situations and serious public safety problems, both of which require considerable 
judgment beyond the application of criminal law”); Stoughton, supra note 81, at 611 (noting 
the wide variety of tasks officers perform). 
 266. Beckett, supra note 29, at 81. 
 267. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 41, at 762 (noting that questions about police discretion 
“depend on empirical assessments, theoretical interpretations, and normative judgments that 
are widely contested”). 
 268. Wesley G. Skogan, Preface, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 6(2004) 
(noting that while practitioners always knew discretion was an important component of 
policing, researchers had not previously focused on it); see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE 
WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 72–74 (1966) (discussing 
police discretion). 
 269. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990 23 (1993) (“[C]ontrolling discretion is usually not a matter of 
simply forbidding something; it is more often a matter of encouraging officers to choose one 
option over another.”); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1133 (2000) 
(defining discretion). 
 270. For the policy demands of leaders of the Black Lives Matter Movement, see End 
Broken Windows Policing, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/broken 
windows [https://perma.cc/46HY-DM4E]. 
 271. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING (2001); Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the 
NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 
813 (2007). 
 272. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding 
discriminatory intent in NYPD practices, including the department’s “stop and frisk” 
practices).  
 273. See, e.g., Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: 
The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc 
/RW4K-SRLL] (detailing the death of Eric Garner and noting that it occurred as a result of the 
“broken-windows” policing strategy of the New York Police Department employed at the 
time); Tierney Sneed, From Ferguson to Staten Island, Questions About Broken Window 
Policing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 14, 2014, 6:30 PM) (“[T]he instances of unarmed, 
black men getting shot and killed under debatable circumstances have put new scrutiny on a 
police tactic known as ‘broken windows,’ in which law enforcement officers focus on rooting 
428 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:389 
 
both of which occurred in the context of broken-windows policing—illustrate the 
potential deadliness of the tactics.274 Because the linchpin of the argument for 
broken-windows policing has been undermined by precipitous drops in crime in 
municipalities where it featured most prominently, even some conservative 
commentators have joined the critique.275  
The reconsideration of broken-windows policing is apparent in the 2015 Final 
Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Report).276 It argues 
for building trust and legitimacy as “the foundational principle [of] the nature of 
relations between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve.”277 In 
particular, the Report exhorts law enforcement agencies to “consider adopting 
preferences for seeking ‘least harm’ resolutions, such as diversion programs or 
warnings and citations in lieu of arrest for minor infractions.”278 This exhortation 
reflects the groundswell of activism against the racially disproportionate deployment 
of this kind of policing.279 
Historically, officers have sometimes looked the other way when confronted with 
illegal drugs—often because the suspected offender was a person with perceived 
social capital, typically white and middle or upper-middle class.280 What the Report 
does is recommend institutionalizing and systematizing individual diversionary 
practices officers long have employed.281    
The evolution in the policing of drug users urged by the Report and seen in the 
current opioid crisis reflects a shift from the warrior mindset of the War on Drugs to 
one that “prioritizes service over crime fighting.”282 For some time, policing scholars 
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have argued for such a shift toward what they refer to as a “guardian” mentality,283 
in which citizen-officer interactions are characterized by mutual respect.284  
Observing the on-the-ground reality of police work in the opioid crisis, one 
commentator hints at the opportunism that may lie below the surface of the changes 
observable in opioid policing: “If there’s anything that could change the perception 
that law enforcement officers have moved from protecting and serving to soldiering 
and bullying, it just might be the opioid epidemic raging across the United States.”285 
This on-the-ground reality, along with recent political and scholarly currents, have 
combined such that police departments can recognize in the complaint of police 
officers—“we can’t arrest our way out of this”—the need for a new approach. Opioid 
policing constitutes an effort to systemically shape discretion to reflect a normative 
position for officers—that they shouldn’t arrest their way out of drug possessory 
offenses.286 
D. New Practices 
In a small but growing number of jurisdictions, police departments have 
systematized the deployment of discretion toward a non-arrest mindset. The first 
approach, discussed in subsection one, is a program that encourages officers to refer 
low-level alleged offenders to community-based services, avoiding jail and 
prosecution.287 The second form of opioid policing, discussed in subsection two, 
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allows individuals to receive priority access to a detoxification program in exchange 
for relinquishment of their illicit drugs.288  
1. Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion  
After years of litigation initiated by racial justice advocates over racially 
disproportionate War on Drugs policing, community stakeholders in Seattle 
convened in 2011 to address their shared perception that change was needed.289 Drug 
sale and use were rampant, and individuals cycled in and out of the criminal system—
serving short sentences and receiving no resources to assist with addressing the issues 
that may have brought them to the attention of the police in the first place.290 Out of 
these convenings, law enforcement officials, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and 
those community members identified as public safety leaders designed the Law 
Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program.291  
LEAD contains two distinct components. The first is a pre-booking diversion 
program for people who could otherwise be arrested for violations of drug or 
prostitution laws.292 Prostitution crimes are included because of data indicating that 
women who are dependent on drugs are more likely to come to the attention of police 
for that offense than for drug offenses.293 In this first version of LEAD, an officer 
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makes an arrest, transports the arrestee to the precinct, and contacts a LEAD case 
manager for an initial screening; the officer typically relinquishes custody of the 
referred person upon the caseworker’s arrival.294 The arresting officer sends the 
arrest record to the misdemeanor or felony prosecutor—these offices maintain the 
records and the authority to charge the arrested person. However, the presumption is 
that charges will not be filed if the individual completes both the initial screening as 
well as a full intake assessment with LEAD case managers within thirty days of the 
referral.295  
The second component is aimed not at situations in which probable cause exists 
for arrest but at individuals believed by police officers to be at risk of future arrest.296 
This so-called “social-contact” component of LEAD enables officers to target people 
believed to engage in drug-related crime, or sex work, within the program’s 
catchment areas.297 Added at the request of police officers,298 the social-contact 
component expands the scope of the program beyond one that is strictly created for 
diversion. LEAD architects view the social-contact component as critical to ensuring 
and maintaining buy-in from officers who are part of the program.299 Without the 
ability proactively to engage people believed to be involved in criminal activity, 
LEAD proponents presumably believe officers will otherwise ignore the relevant 
policy directives.300  
In order to participate in either version of LEAD, an alleged offender must meet 
certain eligibility criteria.301 Typically, anyone suspected of a low-level drug or 
prostitution offense is eligible.302 While the sale of a small amount of drugs is not an 
automatic disqualifier, program administrators must believe that the sale was for 
subsistence or to support a drug habit, rather than to make a profit.303 A prior criminal 
record of serious or violent offenses presumptively disqualifies a person.304 A final 
eligibility criterion is “amenab[ility] to diversion.”305 This phrase is not defined in 
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the program literature and its interpretation appears entirely to be left to program 
administrators.  
LEAD participants have access to a panoply of social services.306 Case managers 
work closely with LEAD-involved individuals to assist them in attaining housing, a 
job or job training, other community services, and treatment.307 They also offer 
personal encouragement and support—all with an aim of staying out of the criminal 
system.308 If LEAD participants are arrested for a subsequent alleged offense, 
officers and prosecutors are encouraged to coordinate with LEAD case managers and 
social workers in lieu of initiating criminal proceedings.309 Assuming the LEAD 
team believes participants are making progress toward the goal and can convince the 
prosecutor of the same, criminal proceedings will not ensue.310  
Initially developed as a pilot project, LEAD is now a permanent part of Seattle 
policing, receiving approximately $1 million in public funding.311 Approximately 
twenty additional jurisdictions have replicated LEAD.312 Dozens more have 
developed pilot projects or are exploring other forms of diversion.313 In 2016, the 
National Institute of Justice rated LEAD a “promising” program.314 The presidential 
election does not appear to have dampened federal enthusiasm for LEAD; the 
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President allocated $2.5 million for LEAD expansion in 2017.315 While a 
comparatively small amount when contrasted with earlier funding for War on Drugs 
programs, the continued funding for the program at any level is notable given the 
otherwise tough-on-crime rhetoric issuing from the Department of Justice.316 
2. Legal Amnesty and Drug Detoxification 
The second form of opioid policing is a program that promises drug-addicted 
users priority access to a detoxification program and a commitment not to arrest or 
initiate criminal proceedings in exchange for their voluntary relinquishment of illicit 
drugs and paraphernalia. Known as the Angel Initiative, it began in 2015 in 
Gloucester, Massachusetts.  
Unlike LEAD, the Angel Initiative was spurred directly by the high rate of 
overdose-related deaths from opioids.317 The program is structured such that users 
who walk into a police station or to an officer in the community and turn over illicit 
drugs can then request immediate entry into drug detox programs.318 On-duty officers 
contact treatment centers to identify a facility with an opening; they then arrange for 
transportation—by ambulance, if necessary.319 If the officer determines that the 
process will take more than a few hours, they assign the drug user to a civilian who 
has volunteered to provide emotional support and to wait with the person until the 
program has a treatment bed.320  
The ideological premises and resources of the Angel Initiative are different from 
those of LEAD. The Angel Initiative focuses entirely on obtaining detoxification 
treatment for users.321 It has not adopted a harm-reduction framework. It is not set up 
to assist drug users with problems other than addiction. Reminiscent of drug courts, 
the Angel Initiative rests on the one-dimensional notion that addiction causes 
criminal behavior. As a Connecticut sheriff overseeing an Angel Initiative puts it: 
“Rather than focus on arrests, if we can put 100 people in treatment, then we are 
preventing crime.”322 In its structure and rhetoric, the Angel Initiative seems to 
presuppose that the difficult life circumstances that frequently accompany drug 
addiction—homelessness, mental health issues, and unemployment—are its result 
rather than its cause or even its correlative. Presumably, once treatment is received, 
the former user is expected to embark upon a law-abiding life.  
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Angel Initiatives have spread quickly; similar programs currently exist in 200 
departments in twenty-eight states.323 They exist in some of the states hardest hit by 
the opioid crisis, no matter the political orientation of the state’s elected leadership.324 
III. THE PROMISE OF OPIOID POLICING  
This Part analyzes the promise of opioid policing, identifying and exploring ways 
in which the two forms improve upon both War on Drugs policing and specialized 
drug courts. Section A considers the practical benefits of LEAD’s harm-reduction 
framework—specifically, enabling alleged drug offenders to stay out of the criminal 
system and attain personal stability—as well as the way in which both programs work 
to reduce the risk of overdose. Section B summarizes recent preliminary and positive 
evaluations of each of the two forms of opioid policing.  
A. Toward a Public-Health Lens on Drug Crimes 
1. Avoidance of Arrest 
Each of the two forms of opioid policing is structured so that alleged drug 
offenders have a better opportunity to avoid criminal justice involvement than they 
would in either War on Drugs policing or drug courts. LEAD offers services prior to 
an arrest; the alleged offender need not enter a guilty plea or be prosecuted in the 
first instance, as drug court participants must.325 The Angel Initiative provides access 
to medical treatment and drug detoxification upon request, and it accepts drugs and 
paraphernalia without imposing criminal consequences.326  
In diverting alleged offenders from the criminal system and into an array of 
services, LEAD recognizes the futility and harm of arrest—apparent since the heyday 
of the War on Drugs and brought into focus with the opioid crisis.327 That is, in 
addition to the typical harms attendant to arrest, a person in the throes of opioid 
dependence is particularly at risk from detention.328 Similarly, as one proponent 
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explains of the Angel Initiative, “It puts police in the lifesaving business instead of 
the spin-drying business of arresting and releasing.”329 This program encourages 
officers to see drug users not, or not only, as criminals—but instead as people 
suffering from the disease of addiction.330  
2. Harm Reduction over Abstinence 
Harm reduction also distinguishes LEAD from the specialized drug courts.331 
Recall that drug courts require participants to abstain from drugs and alcohol; failure 
to do so will result in short periods of incarceration and eventually imposition of a 
jail or prison sentence.332 One justification for jailing drug-court participants for 
relapse is that the threat of incarceration can “propel a defendant through 
treatment.”333 A harm-reduction philosophy rejects this justification as inaccurate 
and misguided. Given that the rate for relapse hovers between forty and sixty 
percent,334 programming for drug users should anticipate it. LEAD embodies the 
notion that it is possible to reduce the harm to and by drug users without either 
demanding abstinence or utilizing jail as a treatment mechanism.335  
While many LEAD enrollees likely want to achieve sobriety—and may ultimately 
succeed—LEAD does not insist on abstinence as a precondition for being accepted 
into or remaining in the program.336 Instead, LEAD program materials make clear 
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that “[p]articipants will be engaged where they are . . . they will not be penalized or 
denied services if they do not achieve abstinence.”337    
Since the threat of arrest works to push illicit drug users and people engaged in 
sex work underground in ways that can exacerbate risk,338 a harm-reduction 
paradigm conceptualizes arrest itself as a secondary harm.339 In directing 
participating officers to view arrest as a “strategy of last resort for low-level drug 
offenses and offenses related [to] behavioral health conditions and/or poverty,”340 
LEAD evinces an awareness of the health-impairing and criminogenic nature not 
only of arrest but also of prosecution and incarceration.341  
LEAD also departs from the judicial-coercion model of drug courts.342 Its 
counselors collaborate with the participant in designing a service plan that the 
participant believes will work.343 LEAD case managers are trained to emphasize that 
meaningful improvements may occur even in the absence of abstinence.344 The 
group’s orientation is that an active and ongoing engagement with clients, 
encouragement of goal-setting, and provision of emotional and financial support as 
they work toward those goals is the best way to assist a client in diminishing harm 
from drug use if not ceasing it altogether.345 In this respect, LEAD departs from the 
drug court notion that the disease of addiction requires treatment and that involuntary 
treatment is not only appropriate but more effective than treatment voluntarily 
entered. Drug courts’ single-minded focus on abstinence from all illegal drug use 
belies the fact that for many users, drug addiction is not necessarily the central risk 
factor or problem in their lives.346 While not explicitly engaging in the debate over 
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how best to characterize addiction, LEAD’s  agnosticism about the abstinence 
imperative for drug users and inclusion of a broad range of services to address overall 
well-being suggests a departure from the one-dimensional disease model on which 
the drug court is founded.347  
Finally, LEAD participants do not “jump the line” in front of non-LEAD 
individuals waiting to access public services. This “nondisplacement principle”348 is 
aimed at ensuring equity among marginalized individuals and “increas[ing] safety 
and order for the community as a whole.”349 This principle also differentiates LEAD 
from drug courts, which are criticized for filling up scarce treatment placements with 
court-ordered individuals who do not need or want the care, but who accept it to 
avoid incarceration.350  
B. On-the-Ground Results 
Two recent outcome evaluations suggest that LEAD has achieved some of its 
stated goals: reducing arrests and serving as a model for cost-effective social service 
provision for individuals who would otherwise be processed through the criminal 
legal system.351 The first study measured the recidivism rates of approximately 200 
LEAD clients against a group of people with similar records who did not participate 
in LEAD.352 LEAD clients were nearly sixty percent less likely to be rearrested for 
additional crimes; the odds that a LEAD client was sentenced to prison in the first 
year after their enrollment in LEAD were eighty-seven percent lower.353 A second 
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study yielded findings suggesting what LEAD architects hypothesized; namely, that 
the attainment of housing, employment, and some form of public benefits correlated 
with reduction in re-arrest.354 Of course, it may be the case that the reductions in re-
arrest resulted only or mostly from the willingness of prosecutors not to bring charges 
when they could have, rather than from an actual reduction in criminal offending. 
Indeed, the Seattle group indicates a high degree of “buy-in” from prosecutors who 
believe prosecution will imperil participants’ progress.355 In any event, the cost 
savings from LEAD were significant. Criminal justice system costs associated with 
LEAD clients decreased by roughly thirty percent relative to the year prior to their 
enrollment in LEAD, while costs for non-LEAD individuals more than doubled in 
that same period.356 
Further, a qualitative evaluation produced similarly promising results.357 A 2015 
set of interviews with a convenience sample of thirty-two LEAD participants 
revealed that all but one reported a positive experience with and perception of the 
program. The characteristics most valued were the program’s client centeredness, 
harm-reduction approach, and ability to follow through with commitments. In 
addition, participants appreciated that the program requested input and required 
involvement from them.358  
Preliminary results of evaluations of the Angel Initiative suggest that the program 
is succeeding in obtaining detoxification for its participants. In the first year of the 
Gloucester program, 376 people entered seeking help a total of 429 times.359 83% of 
those had used opioids that day or the previous one; over 70% had injected heroin.360 
Over half had previously been arrested for drug offenses.361 In 94.5% of instances in 
which a person presented for assistance and was eligible (394 of 417), direct 
placement was offered.362 That placement rate exceeds those reported for hospital-
based initiatives.363 
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A team of doctors and public-health specialists evaluating the Gloucester Angel 
Initiative attributes the high placement rate to a confluence of factors, including the 
motivation of participants to enter treatment, as evidenced by their coming to the 
police station; the additional support provided by volunteers; the fact that officers 
searched for placements twenty-four hours a day; the relationship the police 
established with a local treatment center in which the majority of participants were 
placed; the provision of transportation; and the state-mandated insurance in 
Massachusetts, which covers drug detoxification.364 
In addition to the help provided to individuals seeking treatment, Angel Initiative 
materials claim additional benefits. Namely, communities in which its approaches 
are used have experienced up to a 25% reduction in crime associated with addiction, 
cost savings from placing drug users into treatment rather than the criminal justice 
system, and enhanced trust with community members.365 In addition, the program 
costs roughly $55 per participant—significantly less than the $220 per day cost of 
holding them in jail—and is financed through funds obtained pursuant to drug 
seizures.366 
V. THE LIMITATIONS 
The foregoing analysis of the promise of opioid policing simultaneously reveals 
the extent to which it remains firmly within the contours of the contemporary carceral 
state. Notwithstanding their comparatively benevolent intentions, each of the two 
forms of opioid policing functions to expand police surveillance. In addition, features 
of the two forms re-entrench rather than disrupt the distributive inequities of race and 
class that came to define War on Drugs policing. These issues are explored below.  
A. Expansion of State Surveillance  
Prominent political scientist Marie Gottschalk has described the late twentieth 
century phenomenon in the United States of decimating welfare programs in favor 
of creating law-and-order responses to social problems.367 This carceral state extends 
beyond the well-documented expansion in the jail and prison population over the last 
four decades; it encompasses “the far-reaching and growing range of penal 
punishments and controls that lies in the never-never land between the prison gate 
and full citizenship.”368 Such punishments and controls include probation, parole, 
community sanctions, drug courts, and immigrant detention. The carceral state also 
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extends beyond those personally affected by these consequences and includes the 
more than eight million children who have had an incarcerated parent and whose life 
outcomes are negatively affected by that fact.369 Carceral-state practices also 
influence electoral politics, as six million people are disenfranchised either 
temporarily or permanently because of a criminal conviction.370 School districts 
increasingly rely on the terminology and tactics of the carceral state, employing 
exclusionary discipline as well as arrest for in-school misbehavior that in the past 
would have been handled within the school.371 As Jonathan Simon summarizes, 
“[t]he carceral state exercises permanent surveillance and control, not a single game 
of guilt or innocence.”372  
Each of the two forms of opioid policing, in different ways, functions to expand 
the police and prosecutorial surveillance that are hallmarks of the carceral state. 
Consider first the phenomenon of net widening, in which  programs targeted for a 
limited population instead grow to encompass broader populations, thus losing their 
effectiveness.373 Specifically, efforts at reducing the arrests, detention, and 
incarceration of both juveniles and adults can often instead result in an increased 
overall number of people within the system. In San Francisco in the late 1990s, for 
example, the city received an unprecedented infusion of state and federal money 
designed to establish a new centralized intake system to assess and refer youths to 
community-based services, thereby reducing its long-established overreliance on 
custodial detention.374 Despite lowered rates of crime and a shrinking youth 
population, however, the number of youths in detention did not decrease.375 Instead, 
a group of lower-risk young people who might not have otherwise been charged at 
all were swept into the system, and the population of the city’s juvenile detention 
halls remained steady.376 
The “social-contact” component of LEAD—whereby police officers are 
empowered and even encouraged to reach beyond arrest situations to individuals 
believed to be heavy drug users, whether or not they are engaged in a criminal 
activity at the time377—could implicate net-widening concerns. If LEAD officers 
confine their activities to situations in which they would otherwise arrest, then the 
program can truly be said to be keeping people who would otherwise be in the 
criminal legal system out of it. The social-contact component, however, potentially 
complicates this claim. Police officers who seek out and accost people whom they 
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believe to be drug users without the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion 
that crime is afoot378 are no longer engaged in an explicitly diversionary enterprise. 
However well-intentioned their motivations, these officers have begun a process that 
could result in criminal justice entanglement, whether for a drug offense or 
something else. 
The social-contact component of LEAD also creates problematic policing 
incentives in ways that are reminiscent of drug courts. Critics argue that police 
officers in jurisdictions with the putatively rehabilitative option of drug courts feel 
incentivized to make arrests for low-level drug offenses.379 That is, when a drug court 
is operating successfully under its own terms—providing treatment to individuals 
who need it—officers can feel justified, even righteous, in aggressively policing drug 
buys. The problematic aspects of the Drug War do not even appear salient when 
officers can feel that they are doing social services work, which is the outcome 
created in jurisdictions with drug courts. The more effective the drug court, the more 
this incentive exists.380 One might legitimately worry that the benevolent aspirations 
of the LEAD program may create similar incentives for officers to aggressively 
police and accost individuals whom they might otherwise leave alone. 
An additional problematic feature of opioid policing is the way in which it works 
to monitor and control marginalized populations. Issa Kohler-Hausmann describes 
this problem in a different context as “managerial justice,” arguing that in crowded, 
urban misdemeanor courts, the priority of prosecutors is as much to obtain data from 
arrested individuals useful for future monitoring by the state as it is to fairly prosecute 
criminal charges.381 In a managerial justice regime,382 prosecutors and judges record 
the fact of an encounter and rely on it at later decision points in deciding whether and 
how to impose criminal consequences in the event of an individual’s subsequent 
arrest.383 
The Angel Initiative implicates concerns about managerial justice. One of its key 
components is data collection regarding the individuals who participate.384 The stated 
goal for the collection is the benign one of evaluating program effectiveness.385 
Nonetheless, police departments participating in the program are able to expand their 
database of potential suspects in drug and other crimes, subjecting a broader group 
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to expanded surveillance and tracking than would be the case without the program.386 
Even though no conviction or arrest befalls individuals who are the subject of opioid 
policing, the state nonetheless maintains oversight over their lives. This kind of state 
surveillance does not typically exist for upper-middle-class users of illicit drugs.387 
These users have access to private homes and cars, along with drug dealers who will 
travel to them, such that they do not need to expose themselves to outdoor drug 
markets to buy drugs or to police departments to obtain treatment.388 
 The delivery of social services through police officers raises issues of stigma and 
expertise. Feminist scholars critique the “hyperregulation” of poor women that 
characterizes provision of means-tested welfare benefits in the United States.389  In 
order to obtain needed benefits, poor women must undergo drug testing or 
fingerprinting, for example.390 When the drug treatment and other social services of 
opioid policing are delivered through police officers, rather than hospitals, schools, 
or community-based welfare offices, the receipt of the services becomes more than 
stigmatized—it is explicitly criminalized. In addition, when police officers become 
the primary vehicle through which the state responds to problems related to social 
and economic deprivation such as drug addiction, one might reasonably expect the 
response to be more punitive and controlling than if provided by a trained and 
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experienced social worker.391 Instead of appropriately managing and administering 
social services, the state is engaged in a carceral-state practice of imposing criminal 
justice responses to social welfare concerns.392 
B. Moral Sorting and Bias 
An additional potentially troubling feature of opioid policing is that each of its 
iterations leaves substantial room for what Erin Collins calls the “moral sorting”393 
that characterizes other versions of criminal justice reform. Collins argues that 
proponents of two new forms of “problem-solving” courts—veterans’ courts and 
girls’ courts—invoke a “discourse of difference” to justify the creation of these new 
courts.394 Proponents point to the putatively unique needs and experiences of 
veterans and girls as justifying a different, more rehabilitative set of practices than 
other defendants.395 The primary relevant common characteristic that members of 
each of these groups is thought to share is significant trauma, which can be 
criminogenic.396 As Collins points out, however, a history of trauma is something 
that unites veterans and girls with, rather than distinguishing them from, other 
offenders.397 What is at work in these “status courts,” Collins argues, is not that 
veterans and girls uniquely experience trauma, but instead that their trauma simply 
matters more than that of other defendants.398 And the way in which it matters more 
is that it entitles them to a more empathetic, relational court experience.399 What the 
architects of these status courts are engaging in is what Collins refers to as “moral 
sorting.”400 
An analysis of each of the two versions of opioid policing reveals a similar kind 
of moral sorting. Recall that the aims of LEAD are to reduce the number of people 
entering the criminal justice system for low-level offenses; to undo racial disparities; 
as well as to make improvements in psychosocial, housing, and quality-of-life 
outcomes for participants.401 The original Seattle program and those that have 
emulated it recognize that arrests and prosecution do not help address underlying 
problems that lead to criminal justice involvement for drug users, and that people of 
color disproportionately are affected by Drug War tactics.402 The premise is that with 
the services offered by LEAD case managers, drug users will be able to obtain a level 
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of self-sufficiency that will keep them, long-term, from re-arrest.403 The eligibility 
criteria revolve around ensuring that those admitted to the program are people who 
truly deserve a different approach—meaning those whose criminal offending is 
driven by addiction or mental illness rather than cold economic calculations or anti-
social personalities.404  
Yet, as with status courts, the moral sorting in opioid policing may not always 
lead to evidence-based programming or equitable practices. LEAD presumptively 
excludes from consideration individuals who have at any point been convicted of an 
enumerated set of violent crimes, as well as those who, within a shorter period within 
the past, have been convicted of less serious offenses.405 LEAD architects 
presumably believe, as do many employers and landlords, that serious criminal 
history is predictive of disruption or danger.406 However, there is considerable 
evidence that the “most risky” offenders in fact make the best use of rehabilitative 
interventions.407 Prioritizing participation of offenders with the highest need for 
rehabilitative intervention would seem an appropriate course given LEAD’s goals. 
That is, since the program aims to undo or at least minimize the racial disparities of 
the War on Drugs, it ought not to rely so heavily on prior convictions as proxies for 
program suitability. Prior convictions, after all, may indicate less about the person 
than about the area in which she lives—and how heavily it is policed.408 
A further problematic feature of LEAD design is the fact that one of the criteria 
for eligibility is “amenability to diversion.”409 This phrase is nowhere defined. The 
ambiguous question of whether a person is amenable to diversion is left to the 
referring police officer.410 This conferral of discretion was deliberate and made 
because “[s]takeholders . . . believe that officers possess deep knowledge about the 
people they regularly encounter and are therefore best situated to determine if a 
potential client is in a position to benefit from LEAD.”411 
Yet the capacious category of “amenability to diversion” leaves room for the 
operation of a tremendous amount of bias—against people of color and against 
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people with mental illness, among other variables.412 While initial evaluations seem 
to suggest that the selection of individuals for inclusion has not been racially biased, 
there are few mechanisms to ensure that this remains so. There is no obvious way to 
promote accountability among the various stakeholders.413 The agreements are 
contained only in memoranda of understanding and contain no provision for ensuring 
they are followed.414 As with most internal policing decisions, there is no meaningful 
legal accountability, either. Other than federal oversight through practice and pattern 
lawsuits and individual civil rights lawsuits, there are few claims that can be raised 
about any particular policing strategy.415  
The Angel Initiative’s design reflects and reinforces problematic notions of drug 
users as inherently manipulative, thus similarly exemplifying moral sorting. The 
requirement that drug users walk into the police precinct to ask for help exists in part 
because of a popular conceptualization of drug addicts as inherently manipulative.416 
Describing this walk-in requirement, a Connecticut sheriff opined that a hypothetical 
patrol officer, upon encountering a motorist with heroin, was “not likely to believe a 
driver’s claim that he or she was heading at that moment to the police department for 
help.”417 Unlike LEAD, then, the Angel Initiative specifically excludes from its 
services individuals for whom probable cause exists to arrest, except for the drugs 
that they are intending to relinquish upon entering a precinct. In other words, it is not 
enough that an individual expresses a desire for detoxification and other medical 
treatment. If the officers believe that the user’s desire for treatment is expressed even 
in part as a means of avoiding arrest, her request for a detoxification program will 
likely be rejected.418  
Even measured against its own questionable premises—that detoxification will 
lead to abstinence, which will in turn reduce law-breaking behavior—the Angel 
Initiative appears to come up short.  Preliminary data analysis indicates that  a total 
of 81% of Angel Initiative participants had, at the time of admission, already received 
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treatment for detoxification at least once—and 31% had more than six detoxification 
attempts.419 Detoxification alone appears unlikely, then, to be sufficient to ensure 
abstinence. Furthermore, most Angel Initiative participants do not gain access to 
long-term treatment programs after they go through detox.420 
The determination about who “deserves” a drug-treatment spot in a universe of 
severely constrained supply is necessarily a subjective one. Yet  it requires a level of 
training, education, and experience that police likely lack. Law enforcement officers 
cannot necessarily determine who really wants treatment—or who most deserves it. 
Nor can they tell who can benefit most from the programming. 
C. Distributive Inequities 
Opioid policing implicates distributive equity issues.421 Consider the Angel 
Initiative, which arranges priority detoxification spots for those who present 
themselves to the police. 422 On the one hand, ensuring detox for people struggling 
with drug dependency—and who may be at risk of overdose—seems a vast 
improvement over other forms of officer engagement with people who are ill.423 
Examples abound of law enforcement officers mistreating seriously mentally ill 
people who are not properly medicated,424 including accounts of friends and family 
of mentally ill people seeking assistance from the police  
—only to have the encounter end with the mentally ill person arrested, tased, or 
shot.425 Shepherding people with drug addiction through hospitalization and 
detoxification suggests officers commendably acting as “guardians” rather than 
“warriors,”426 in marked contrast with War on Drugs policing tactics.  
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On the other hand, it is problematic to create a program that prioritizes scarce 
treatment spots427 for people who feel comfortable walking into police precincts 
carrying illicit drugs. Providers who participate in Angel Initiative networks have 
already noted that the model is not sustainable on a long-term basis without 
additional treatment beds.428 While the program does not deny assistance to anyone, 
including people with criminal records, the fact remains that the mistrust between 
police and low-income communities of color built up over generations and 
exacerbated by the Drug War means that individuals from those communities have 
well-founded reasons to be apprehensive about claims that officers only want to 
help.429 The structure of the Angel Initiative necessarily privileges those individuals 
who historically have been beneficiaries of the deployment of individual police 
discretion not to arrest—namely, white people, and people without criminal records. 
Further, immigrants in need of drug treatment are likely to be unwilling to access it 
through approaching the police.430 As a result, while the engagement of officers with 
medical providers is a salutary development, the structure of the Angel Initiative 
recapitulates the racial and socioeconomic disparities of the War on Drugs.    
If  “opioid policing” is driven by the fact that the face of the opioid epidemic is 
white, and middle-class, and that many users became addicted after initially having 
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valid prescriptions,431 one must wonder whether the service-oriented response will 
remain as the nature and scope of the epidemic changes.432 As noted, heroin and 
synthetic fentanyl are continuing to outpace prescription painkillers as the prime 
source of addiction, overdose, and death.433 Users of these drugs are increasingly 
portrayed as the “junkies” we have been conditioned to respond to with something 
other than compassion—with, to be precise, arrest, prosecution, and incarceration.434  
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis of two law enforcement innovations responding to the 
opioid epidemic has engaged questions that have long preoccupied legal scholars of 
how officers police, and to what end. Specifically, it has considered how police 
departments that seek to institutionalize nonarrest responses to alleged drug 
offenders define their goals—and whether they accomplish them. If local 
stakeholders perceive that these efforts are reducing the incidence of overdose and 
reducing crime, we might reasonably expect to see even more replication. 
Yet replication attempts will confront practical and political obstacles. The first 
and most obvious such obstacle is that each of the opioid policing programs relies on 
an ability to access social services and drug treatment. LEAD participants make use 
of Medicaid to access the different services they are offered.435 The cities 
implementing LEAD are primarily in states that have expanded Medicaid, which is 
critical to the program’s affordability.436 Where Medicaid is harder to obtain, so too 
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are services. Yet the demand for treatment far outpaces its availability, even for drug 
users with Medicaid.437 
Secondly, both LEAD and the Angel Initiative are heavily dependent on grants 
from foundations and individuals.438 This fiscal situation is a microcosm of the fact 
that, as public health and addiction experts note, the federal government has 
committed but a fraction of the funding that is needed to address the widespread and 
growing harms from opioid misuse.439 Instead, the current presidential administration 
seems eager to re-up aspects of the War on Drugs.440 In addition, states across the 
country are heightening criminal penalties for the sale and distribution of heroin, 
fentanyl, carfentanil, and other controlled substances, in addition to passing drug-
induced homicide statutes.441 Prosecutions under drug-induced homicide laws have 
increased by more than 300% in just six years, from 363 in 2011 to 1178 in 2016.442 
Praised by legislators and prosecutors as sending a strong message to dealers, drug-
induced homicide cases may instead create a chilling effect among drug users, 
deterring them from calling 911 during an overdose.443 Of those who have witnessed 
an overdose, more than half reported they are reluctant to dial 911, citing fear of legal 
consequences.444 Rather than prosecuting upper-echelon drug distributors, these 
cases often target friends and romantic partners of the overdose victim.445  
Even in the event of successful replication, the opioid policing approach does 
nothing about the social and economic factors underlying the epidemic, and it may 
in fact function to distract policymakers from addressing them. Opioids appear to be 
exacerbating cumulative disadvantage for working-class people without a college 
degree.446 In one small community besieged with opioid use, individuals “referenced 
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the hopelessness of the area and its lack of opportunity as driving the use of heroin, 
with many explicitly suggesting the need for jobs and community reinvestment to 
reduce fatalities.”447 One study found that overdose death rates correlate with lack of 
social capital; scholars argue that this relationship likely exists through some 
combination of mechanisms, such as the ability of social capital to prevent the drug 
use, aid in recovery, and reduce the fatality rate of drug overdose.448 While opioid 
policing moves in welcome ways beyond the War on Drugs and the specialized drug 
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